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PARENTAL RIGHTS AND THE STATE REGULATION OF 
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS 
Matthew Steilen * 
ABSTRACT 
In Wisconsin v. Yoder, the United States Supreme Court 
invalidated convictions of several Amish parents for removing 
their children from school in violation of state mandatory 
attendance laws. In reaching its decision, the Court argued 
that protecting the Amish parents' decisions fit into a long-
standing American tradition of giving parents control over the 
upbringing of their children. Yet the Supreme Court 
mischaracterized the history of parental rights and state 
interests in education. Contemporary historical research shows 
that parents have long ceded a large measure of control to the 
state in the education of their children. Still, very little has 
been written about this scholarship in legal journals. This 
article attempts to remedy this deficiency. It isolates and 
explores three key periods in the development of state-
administered public schools, paying special attention to early 
public funding of religious schools, the Protestant character of 
the common schools, and Catholic resistance to the use of the 
King James Bible in common schools. In so doing, this article 
argues for a "republican" interpretation of early educational 
practices. Drawing on that interpretation, the article joins a 
debate between Noah Feldman, Martha Nussbaum, and others 
about the nature of American religious liberties, and argues 
that their views are not able to fully acknowledge the history of 
Protestant evangelizing in public schools. 
* Law clerk to the Honorable Kermit V. Lipez. Ph.D. 2005, Northwestern. J.D . 2008, 
Stanford. This essay was prepared for the Stanford Legal Studies Workshop, 2007-
2008. I a m grateful to members of the workshop for their comments, a nd to Larry 
Kramer, J oe Bankman, and Rob Reich for their guidance. Finally, thank you to Jeff 
Peterson, Cara Xidis, Chad Olsen, Cristi Barnes, Alisi Langi, J anice Smith and 
McKenna Woodger of the BYU Education and Law Journal for their excellent editorial 
work. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Legal Use of Educational History 
In State v. Whis ner, the Ohio Supreme Court considered the 
case of twelve parents indicted by a grand jury for violations of 
a state education law that required parents to send their 
children to schools that conformed to "minimum standards" 
established by the State Board of Education.' The parents had 
enrolled their children in Tabernacle Christian School, a "Bible 
oriented" school that employed the Accelerated Christian 
Education program, or "A.C.E." In the A.C.E. curriculum, 
students work on their own through a series of workbooks.2 
The school principal, Reverend Levi Whisner, headed the 
Tabernacle Christian Church, a church "not tied to any 
religious system," but based on the idea that one could be "born 
again" into "a life separate from sin."3 Tabernacle aimed to 
impart these beliefs to the parish children. 
At trial, the parents testified that they sent their children 
to Tabernacle because it was the only school in the area that 
provided a "sound education in an atmosphere . . . compatible 
with . . . Christian beliefs."4 In contrast, the parents said local 
public schools had suffered a "moral breakdown," and they 
could not in good conscience send their children there.5 One 
mother testified that sending her children to public school 
would be failing her duty to provide her children with the ''best 
education possible."6 At the conclusion of trial, the parents 
moved for acquittal, arguing that Ohio's compulsory 
attendance statute, as applied to them, violated their right and 
their children's right to the free exercise of religion under the 
First Amendment. 7 The trial court denied the motion. The 
parents were convicted and the conviction was upheld on 
appeal. 
The Supreme Court of Ohio reversed. It held that Ohio's 
compulsory attendance law substantially burdened the 
1. State v. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d 750, 753, 764 (1976). 
2. ld. at 752, 755- 56. 
3. ld. at 754- 55. 
4. ld. at 756. 
5. ld. 
6. ld. 
7. Id. at 757- 58. 
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defendants' religious practices, implicating the Free Exercise 
Clause under the rule of Wisconsin v. Yoder. 8 The court's focus 
was on the substance of the "minimum standards" 
requirement. Among other things, the standards required Ohio 
schools to obtain state-issued charters, to submit to inspection 
before a charter was issued, to allocate the entire instructional 
time to various secular subjects, and to conform all school 
activities to policies adopted by the board of education.9 In 
addition to the standards, Ohio law included a section entitled 
"Interpretative and Explanatory Information," which contained 
principles to guide school administrators in conforming to the 
minimum standards. 10 These provisions specified, for example, 
that "common problems are solved through the consensus of 
thinking and action of individuals in the group;" that 
"[o]rganized group life of all types must act in accordance with 
established rules of social relationships and a system of social 
controls;" and that a child's health is the "single greatest factor 
in the development of a well rounded personality." 11 
While the Ohio Supreme Court criticized several of the 
minimum standards and interpretative principles, it focused its 
attention on the requirement that Ohio schools conform all of 
their activities to school board policies. 12 According to the 
court, it would be impossible for a religiously neutral school 
board to regulate all the activities of Tabernacle, since those 
would necessarily include religious activities. A board 
regulating all school activities would be compelled to take 
positions that favored some religious practices and disfavored 
others. 13 Furthermore, the court held that the minimum 
standards were so extensive that requiring Tabernacle to 
comply with all of them would "eradicate the distinction 
between public and non-public education, and thereby deprive 
these appellants of their traditional interest as parents to 
direct the upbringing and education of their children." 14 In 
these ways, the regulations imposed an undue burden on the 
8. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d at 764. 
9. Id. at 762 (citing EDb- 401-02 (1976)). 
10. Id. at 750, 752- 53. 
11. ld. at 763 (quoting EDb-401- 03(b) (1976)). 
12. Id. at 765-66. 
13. Id. at 766. As the court hints, this result could also be analyzed as a violation 
of the Establishment Clause requirement of neutrality, or no excessive entanglement. 
14. Whisner, 351 N.E.2d at 768. 
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parents' ability to exercise their genuinely held religious 
beliefs. Under Yoder and other cases, only a compelling state 
interest could justify such an infringement. The court found no 
such compelling interest underlying the minimum standards. 
The burden imposed by the law was so severe, the court said, it 
was "difficult to imagine" what state interest could possibly 
suffice. 15 The court concluded that the state could not infringe 
upon the parents' educational rights through the use of the 
minimum standards. 
The reasoning of the Ohio Supreme Court in Whisner was 
by no means unusual. 16 In large part, the court followed the 
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court, which has long 
recognized the right of parents to control the education of their 
children. In 1923, the Court, in Meyer v. Nebraska, struck down 
a state statute criminalizing instruction in a foreign language, 
holding that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment protected the right of parents to educate their 
children.17 Two years later, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the 
Court reaffirmed this reasoning, striking down an Oregon 
compulsory attendance statute that, in effect, rendered private 
education unlawful. 18 Characterizing its earlier decision m 
Meyer, the Court observed: 
[W]e think it entirely plain that the [Oregon] Act of 1922 
unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and 
guardians to direct the upbringing and education of children 
under their control. . . . The child is not the mere creature of 
the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have 
the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and 
prepare him for additional obligations. 19 
Both Meyer and Pierce found constitutional support for 
parental educational rights in the Fourteenth Amendment's 
Due Process Clause. Almost twenty years later, in Prince v. 
Massachusetts , the Court found support in a new source, the 
First Amendment, applied to the states through 
15. / d . at 771. 
16. See, e.g, Miller v. Catholic Diocese of Great Falls, 728 P .2d 794 (Mont. 1986); 
see also Braintree Baptist Temple v. Holbrook Pub. Sch., 616 F. Supp. 81 (D. Mass. 
1984); RALPH D. MAWDSLEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF RELIGIOUS AND Plt!VATE SCHOOLS 
207- 11 (2006); Julie Underwood O'Hara , State Accreditation of Non-Public Schools: 
Quality Regulations and the Fi rst Amendment , 1 ED. LAW REP. 5, 5-10 (1982). 
17. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 400 (1923). 
18. Pierce v . Soc'y of Sis ters, 268 U. S. 510, 534-35 (1925) . 
19. /d. 
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incorporation. 20 The petitioner in Prince sought to overturn her 
conviction in state court for furnishing a child with religious 
leaflets with knowledge that the child would distribute them.21 
Although the Prince Court ultimately rejected the petitioner's 
constitutional challenge, it recognized that both religious and 
educational liberty interests were at stake. This provided a 
new legal foundation for parental rights and gave parents an 
additional means of attacking regulations.22 
One such attack proved successful in Wisconsin v. Yoder. 23 
In Yoder, the Court upheld an order of the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court reversing judgment against Amish parents for violating 
the state compulsory attendance law.24 The parents had 
withdrawn their children from school after eighth grade, 
reasoning that the values taught in school were contrary to 
Amish religious beliefs and that attendance there was contrary 
to the Amish way of life. When the schools complained, the 
state charged, tried and convicted the parents, fining them 
each five dollars. In defense, the parents asserted that 
Wisconsin's compulsory attendance statute violated their 
parental rights, as protected by both the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments. 25 The Supreme Court agreed.26 It characterized 
parental educational rights as a form of religious liberty, and 
concluded that these rights were due the same consideration 
afforded free exercise rights-rights which had trumped 
competing state interests since "[l]ong before" anyone 
acknowledged a need for public education. In the words of the 
Court, 
Long before there was general acknowledgment of the need 
for universal formal education, the Religion Clauses had 
specifically and firmly fixed the right to free exercise of 
religious beliefs, and buttressing this fundamental right was 
an equally firm, even if less explicit, prohibition against the 
establishment of any religion by government. The values 
underlying these two provisions relating to religion have been 
20. Prince v. Mass., 321 U.S. 158, 165- 66 (1944). 
21. Id. at 160. 
22. At the time of Prince, parents had been making religious arguments against 
state educational regulations for almost ninety years , but mostly to state courts, and 
with limited success. 
23. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972). 
24. Id. at 234. 
25. Id. at 207- 09. 
26. Id. at 236. 
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~ealously protected, sometimes even at the exrense of other 
mterests of admittedly high social importance.2 
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. The state interest in education, the Court said, was no 
different. Where parents chose an education for their children 
that functioned to transmit and preserve a particular religious 
way of life, the choice was protected by the Free Exercise 
Clause-even at the expense of contrary state interests.28 
Indeed, to permit otherwise would give the state, not the 
parents, a "large measure [of] influence" over a child's religious 
future. 29 In the Court's view, no historical support existed for 
such an outcome, which would run contrary to rights 
established "beyond debate" in this country: "The history and 
culture of Western civilization reflect a strong tradition of 
parental concern for the nurture and upbringing of their 
children. This primary role of the parents in the upbringing of 
their children is now established beyond debate as an enduring 
American tradition."30 
The Whisner decision fits snugly into this line of cases. 
Whisner, like Yoder, accords a "traditional" status to parental 
interests in directing the education of children. 31 In contrast, 
state interests in regulating education, although significant, 
are relatively newfound. 32 Because parents have long directed 
the education of their children, state regulations that unduly 
burden this interest must withstand strict scrutiny.33 To be 
sure, Whisner differs from Yoder in a crucial respect. In Yoder, 
the Court considered only Wisconsin's interest in mandating 
secondary education until age sixteen, an interest the Court 
found less significant than the state interest in primary 
education. 34 Yet, this difference goes only to the strength of the 
27. Id. at 214. 
28. ld. a t 215- 19. 
29. Id. at 232. 
30. ld. 
31. Wh isner, 351 N. E. 2d at 768. 
32. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 225-26. 
33. S ee Whisner, 351 N.E.2d at 771, 771 n.17; Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. 
34. S ee Yoder, 406 U.S. at 226-28. More precisely, the Yoder Court narrowed the 
state interest in question to the interest in mandating secondary education between 
eighth gra de and age sixteen, since the respondents had all attended eighth grade and 
Wisconsin law required sch ool at tendance only until age sixteen. In contrast, in 
Whisner, the Ohio Supreme Court was concerned with the state's interest in regulating 
the education of all school-age children. See Whisner, 351 N.E. 2d at 751 (describing 
regulations in question). 
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state's interest, not to the appropriate level of scrutiny35-the 
latter being a much more significant determination. In 
contrast, the Yoder Court's view that parents had long enjoyed 
control over the education of their children appears to have 
supported the application of strict scrutiny.36 The Whisner 
court seems to have employed the history to much the same 
end.37 
Educational history figures centrally in the Supreme 
Court's analysis of conflicts between parents and the state over 
religious education. Yet, the Court's discussion of history is 
significantly flawed. 38 It is true that, as Justice Burger noted, 
parents have long played the central role in directing the 
upbringing of their children. At this level of generality, the 
proposition is surely correct. The weakness of the claim is in 
the details. As a closer look at the history of education shows, 
parents have long ceded important aspects of control over 
education-even religious education-to the state. This 
suggests that state regulations of religious education deserve 
less exacting scrutiny from courts. 
For example, the Yoder Court was incorrect in stating that 
the Free Exercise Clause protected rights of conscience long 
before any perceived need for universal formal education. 39 
Several of the country's founders, including Jefferson, 
35. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 225-26 (weighing state interest after articulating 
standard in part I of the opinion). 
36. See id. at 213-14. 
37. See Whisner, 351 N.E.2d at 768, 771 . 
38. I do not mean to suggest that the Court's discussion of the history of 
education was uniformly wrong. At least some of what it said about educational 
practices and state interests in education is correct. The errors relate to the Court's 
discussion of parental interests. 
39. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215. The support for this claim and the others in this 
paragraph will be laid out in detail in Part II.A, infra. Regarding a system of public 
education, Jefferson introduced a bill into the Virginia legislature in 1778 proposing a 
system of education that included primary and secondary schools. At roughly the same 
time, he proposed a Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, an important forerunner 
of the federal Free Exercise Clause. The Supreme Court made note of Jefferson's 
interest in common schooling in Yoder, but dismissed it on the grounds that J efferson 
had not supported mandatory attendance laws. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 226 n.14. Yet 
compulsory attendance statutes were hardly the only way states interefered with 
parental educational choices; nearly every plank of the common school reform divested 
parents of control, including textbook reform (fa milies previously had their own 
textbooks), teacher credentialing, and public funding. See infra Part III.B . Moreover, 
Jefferson is significant, not as a proponent of mandatory public education, but because 
he articulated the reasons a democracy has an interest in universal formal education. 
See infra Part II.B. These reasons t end to justify compulsory a ttendance sta tutes, 
whether Jefferson himself supported such laws or not. 
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perceived the need for universal formal education (including 
secondary education), expressed that need on many occasions, 
and actively supported plans in state legislatures and Congress 
in pursuit of that goal.40 While Jefferson ultimately failed to 
push through much of his system, a later generation of 
reformers succeeded, still decades before the First Amendment 
was applied to protect the religious educational choices of 
parents.41 The Supreme Court thus inverted the order of 
events; states regulated religious education long before the 
First Amendment was applied to protect parental choices from 
state interference. 
More generally, the history of American education shows 
that we have neither a tradition of absolute parental control 
over education, nor a tradition of absolute state control. 
Although parents have long had some control over what their 
children learn, for how long they learn, and from whom they 
learn, states have long sought to appropriate some of this 
control, restricting what is learned, for how long, from whom, 
and at whose expense. States have done this because of the 
importance they have long attached to education. The most 
striking example of state appropriation of control over 
education is the creation of the common schools in the 
nineteenth century.42 The intense social changes of that time, 
including immigration and urbanization, led Americans to look 
to universal education as a means of ensuring socal stability.43 
40. See infra Part II.A. 
41. See infra Parts III & IV. Here, I refer to the common school reformers. The 
common school movement, which they led, began in the 1830s and continued 
throughout the nineteenth century. As we will see, the curriculum of the common 
schools was religious, yet the schools were regulated by the states. In contrast, the 
Supreme Court did not suggest that the First Amendment imposed a limit on state 
regulation of religious education until Prince, in the 1940s. Prince, 321 U.S at 165-66. 
This is over 100 years after the birth of the common schools. The discrepancy cannot be 
explained entirely by the date of incorpora tion of the Religion Clauses. Even in states 
whose constitutions possessed similar provisions protecting religious liberty, lawsuits 
challenging the religious content of state school curricula were rare in the nineteenth 
century. DAVID TYACK, THOMAS JAMES & AARON BENAVOT, LAW AND THE SHAPING OF 
PUBLIC EDUCATIO N, 1785-1954 163 (1987) . The first notable state-court challenge of 
Bible reading occurred in the 1850s, and there were only twenty-five such suits over 
the seventy year period from 1854 to 1924. Id. Below, I analyze one of the earliest such 
successful suits, Cinncinnati Board of Education v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 (1872). See 
infra Part IV.B. 
42. See infra Part III .B. 
43. See infra Part IIIB.; see infra note 44. The social changes I refer to are 
primarily t he rise of cities and the influx of Catholic immigrants. These changes 
instigated concerns about stability. 
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Many reformers argued that the state should use schools to 
"Americanize" newly-arrived immigrants-a practice clearly 
intended to interfere with the efforts of parents to pass on 
ethnic, cultural and religious traditions.44 To that end, school 
curricula included explicit religious content.45 These schools 
were funded at least in part by public monies.46 
History also shows that the concepts we use today to 
analyze legal, education-related conflicts between parents and 
the state are relatively new. Many early educational practices 
do not fit neatly into contemporary legal categories. For 
example, the distinction between public and private education, 
so central today, simply did not exist until the 1830s.47 Nor 
were conflicts between parents and the state typically 
conceived of as legal-they were political conflicts and resolved 
at the ballot box or in state legislatures.48 Where legal conflicts 
did emerge, "parental rights" lacked constitutional significance. 
Although courts at common law recognized a parental right to 
control the education of children, those rights could be 
abrogated by acts of the legislature,49 and the assertion that 
parental rights were a trump against state regulation did not 
emerge until the end of the nineteenth century. 50 This suggests 
that it is inaccurate to characterize parental rights as 
"traditional" in contrast to the powers of the state. 51 
This article attempts to illustrate the variety of educational 
concepts, theories and practices existent in the early republic 
and antebellum periods. As Bernard Bailyn observed in his 
work on the subject, a history of American education is a 
history of American culture, since education is, in its broadest 
44. See, e.g., CARL KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND 
AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780-1860, at 77(describing ideology of school reformers); id. at 80 
(describing anxieties); id. at 163 (noting the view that the Irish Catholics should be 
Americanized in the schools). See also infra Part III.B. 
45. See infra Parts II.C. & III. The examples are numerous. Students read from 
the Protestant Bible and sang Protestant hymns, among other things. 
46. See, e.g., KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 117; see Part III, infra . 
47. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 166-67 (1983). 
48. See supra note 380 and accompanying text; see Part IV (describing conflicts 
involving Catholics). 
49. See, e.g., Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Garvin Cty, 103 P . 578 (Okla. 1909) 
(recognizing the authority of the parent over the education of the child "except where 
modified by statute"). 
50. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 163 (discussing challenges to 
Bible reading in the curriculum). 
51. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. 
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sense, the mechanism by which one generation transmits its 
culture to the next. 52 Such a work is obviously beyond the scope 
of a short paper. This article by no means purports to offer a 
complete account of education history, or even, for that matter, 
a modestly detailed one. Instead, it aims to adduce details and 
highlight trends documented by leading education historians. 
Using the scholarship of Lawrence Cremin, Carl Kaestle, and 
David Tyack as a foundation, this article draws original legal 
conclusions about parental interests and religious liberties.53 
Although the works of Cremin, Kaestle and Tyack are well-
known in the fields of education and history,54 they have 
received relatively scant attention in the field of law. 55 While 
there is a substantial body of historical literature on federal 
jurisprudence of religious education after the first World War,56 
not enough has been said in legal scholarship about education 
in earlier periods, during which the American tradition of joint 
parent-state control over education took shape. 
B. Education and the Meaning of the Religion Clauses 
An awareness of the history of education is also essential 
52 . BERNARD BAILYN, EDUCATION IN THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 14 
(1960). 
53. See, e.g. , TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41; KAESTLE, supra note 44; 
LAWRENCE CREMIN, A.M:ERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, 1783-1876 
(1980) [hereinafter THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE); LAWRENCE CREMIN, AMERICAN 
EDUCATION: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, 1607-1783 (1970) [hereinafter THE COLONIAL 
EXPERIENCE]. 
54. For an example of its use in larger, synthetic histories, see DANIEL WALKER 
HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 
449-55 (2007). 
55. See, e.g., MARTHA C . NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF 
AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 214- 21 (2008); NOAH FELDMAN, 
DIVIDED BY GOD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM-AND WHAT WE SHOULD Do 
ABOUT IT 57-110 (2005) [hereinafter DIVIDED BY GOD); Michael Newson, Common 
School Religion: Judicial Narratives in a Protestant Empire, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 
219 (2002); John E. Jeffries & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment 
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001). 
56. See, e.g., WILL!AlVJS ROSS, FORGI NG NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM, EDUCATION, 
AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917-1927 (1996); Eric DeGroff, State Regulation of Nonpublic 
Schools: Does the Tie Still Bind?, 2003 B .Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 363 (2003); Edward 
Gaffney, Jr. , Pie rce and Parental Liberty as a Core Value in Educational Policy, 78 U. 
DET. MERCY L . REV. 491 (2001); J a y S. Bybee , Substantive Due Process and Free 
Exercise of Religion: Meyer, Pierce and the Origins of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 CAP. U. L . 
REV. 887 (1996). For a contemporary treatment of these issues, see JAMES DWYER, 
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998); ROBERT KUNZMAN, GRAPPLING WITH 
THE GOOD (2006); Rob Reich, Opting Out of Education: Yoder, Mozert, and the 
Autonomy of Children, 52 EDUC. THEORY 445 (2003) . 
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for First Amendment scholarship. Scholars of the Religion 
Clauses often overlook the significance of educational practices. 
For example, while it is true that, as a leading scholar 
observed, "by 1834, no state in the Union would have an 
established church,"57 states continued to support and to 
regulate religious education long past 1834, until the end of the 
nineteenth century. As is now well documented in historical 
scholarship, the common school system, which was created 
during this period, was, in effect, state-sponsored Protestant 
education, replete with singing hymns, reciting prayers, and 
reading the King James Bible-as well as discrimination and 
violence directed towards non-Protestants. For this reason, it is 
hard to regard "universal disestablishment" as evidence that by 
1834 "the tradition of separation between church and state 
would seem an ingrained and vital part of our constitutional 
system."58 How could that be, when the school system-then 
the country's largest and most successful bureaucracy, short of 
the military-was devoted to inculcating sectarian religious 
beliefs?59 Even after universal disestablishment, states offered 
denominational instruction in public schools and funded many 
parochial schools. 60 
Even where legal scholars take note of the history of 
education, they often paint only a partial picture. Again, First 
Amendment scholarship provides an illustration. Our 
educational practices pose a challenge for scholars of the First 
Amendment because they do not fit neatly into the leading 
accounts of religious liberty. Accounts of the Religion Clauses 
can be divided into equality theories and liberty theories. 61 
57. Michael W. McConnell , The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 103 H ARV. L. REV. 1409, 1437 (1990). 
58. ld. 
59. See infra Part III. 
60. See KAcESTLE, supra note 44, at 167 (describing the use of public funds to 
support Catholic schools and observing, "[t]he idea of separation of church and state 
with regard to education did not spring full-blown from the United States Constitution. 
It was a public policy developed gradually and unevenly at the local level during the 
nineteenth century."). 
6L This distinct ion is not intended to be exhaustive. Nor is it the only possible 
distinction between different accounts of our religious liberties. For exa mple, another 
common distinction is between voluntarism, or separatism, and nonpreferentialism. 
KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 495, 507 (2003). The voluntarism-
nonpreferentialism distinction shares elements in common with liberty theory-equality 
theory distinction. But there are differences between the distinctions as well. Most 
notably, the voluntarism-nonpreferentialism distinction is, at its core, a doctrinal 
distinction, while the liberty theory-equality theory distinction is best described as a 
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Accordin.g to equality th~~ries, the purpose of the Religion c;au~es ~S to p~e~erve pofLtLCa[ equality by protecting members 
o mmonty rehgw~s from members of majority religions. To 
take ~he most promment example, Justice O'Connor defends an 
equahty theor~ of the Establishment Clause, under which the ~·laus~ constrams the public display of religious symbols She 
Irst mtroduced the equality theory in her concurren~e in 
Ly nch u. Donnelly. ~2 Lynch ~oncerned an Establishment Clause 
challenge to a C.hnstmas display in a city park. 63 Writing for 
the Court, Ju.stice Burger applied Lemon v. Kurtzman and 
upheld the display. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor 
attempted to refocus Lemon. She suggested that at its core the 
Es~a?lishment Clause prohibited the governme~t from making 
r ehgwn releva nt to political standing. 64 The government would 
offend this principle if it indicated that Christians were 
members of a favored, inside group, and non-Christians 
disfavored outsiders.65 O'Connor argued that the city display in 
Lynch did not communicate such a message. The variety of 
symbols in the display suggested the celebration of a shared, 
public holiday, not religious favoritism. 66 In broader terms, the 
public display left undisturbed the political equality of 
Christians and non-Christians. Justice O'Connor's equality 
theory thus articulates a limit on public displays of r eligious 
symbols.67 
Martha Nussbaum defends a broader version of the 
equality theory, arguing that both the Establishment Clause 
and the Free Exercise Clause are best understood in terms of 
political equality.68 Moreover, unlike Justice O'Connor in 
Lynch,69 Nussbaum defends h er equality theory on historical 
grounds. According to Nussbaum, history shows that the 
"dominant American political tradition" rejects "in-group" 
disti nction between competing political va lues. 
62. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U. S. 668, 687 (1984) ; Noah Feldman. From Liberty to 
Equality: The Transf'ormation of' the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. RF.V. 673. 694 
(2002) [hereina fter Liberty to Equality]. 
6:3. Lynch, 46fl U.S. at 671-72. 
64. Id. at 672 (q uoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 40 :~ U. S. 602, 614 (I971)) . 
65. Jd. at 687- 88. 
66. Jd. at 688. 
67. Th e court endorsed O'Connor's equality theory of the Establishment Clause in 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU , 492 U.S. fl73 (1989). 
68. NUSSBAUM, supra note fl5 , at 16. 
G9. Liberty to Equality, supra note 62, at 694. 
278 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2009 
Many reformers argued that the state should use schools to 
"Americanize" newly-arrived immigrants-a practice clearly 
intended to interfere with the efforts of parents to pass on 
ethnic, cultural and religious traditions.44 To that end, school 
curricula included explicit religious content.45 These schools 
were funded at least in part by public monies.46 
History also shows that the concepts we use today to 
analyze legal, education-related conflicts between parents and 
the state are relatively new. Many early educational practices 
do not fit neatly into contemporary legal categories. For 
example, the distinction between public and private education, 
so central today, simply did not exist until the 1830s.47 Nor 
were conflicts between parents and the state typically 
conceived of as legal-they were political conflicts and resolved 
at the ballot box or in state legislatures.48 Where legal conflicts 
did emerge, "parental rights" lacked constitutional significance. 
Although courts at common law recognized a parental right to 
control the education of children, those rights could be 
abrogated by acts of the legislature,49 and the assertion that 
parental rights were a trump against state regulation did not 
emerge until the end of the nineteenth century.50 This suggests 
that it is inaccurate to characterize parental rights as 
"traditional" in contrast to the powers of the state. 51 
This article attempts to illustrate the variety of educational 
concepts, theories and practices existent in the early republic 
and antebellum periods. As Bernard Bailyn observed in his 
work on the subject, a history of American education is a 
history of American culture, since education is , in its broadest 
44. See, e.g., CARL KAESTLE, PILLARS OF THE REPUBLIC: COMMON SCHOOLS AND 
AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1780-1860, at 77(describing ideology of school reformers); id. at 80 
(describing anxieties); id. at 163 (noting the view that the Irish Catholics should be 
Americanized in the schools). See also infra Part III. B. 
45. See infra Parts Il.C. & III. The examples are numerous. Students read from 
the Protestant Bible and sang Protestant hymns, among other things. 
46. See, e.g. , KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 117; see Part Ill , infra. 
47. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 166-67 (1983). 
48. See supra note 380 and accompanying text; see Part IV (describing conflicts 
involving Catholics). 
49. See, e.g. , Sch. Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Garvin Cty, 103 P. 578 (Okla. 1909) 
(recognizing the authority of the parent over the education of the child "except where 
modified by statute"). 
50. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 163 (discussing challenges to 
Bible reading in the curriculum) . 
51. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214. 
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sense, the mechanism by which one generation transmits its 
culture to the next. 52 Such a work is obviously beyond the scope 
of a short paper. This article by no means purports to offer a 
complete account of education history, or even, for that matter, 
a modestly detailed one. Instead, it aims to adduce details and 
highlight trends documented by leading education historians. 
Using the scholarship of Lawrence Cremin, Carl Kaestle, and 
David Tyack as a foundation, this article draws original legal 
conclusions about parental interests and religious liberties. 53 
Although the works of Cremin, Kaestle and Tyack are well-
known in the fields of education and history,54 they have 
received relatively scant attention in the field of law.55 While 
there is a substantial body of historical literature on federal 
jurisprudence of religious education after the first World War,56 
not enough has been said in legal scholarship about education 
in earlier periods, during which the American tradition of joint 
parent-state control over education took shape. 
B. Education and the Meaning of the Religion Clauses 
An awareness of the history of education is also essential 
52. BERNARD BAILYN, EDUCATION IN THE FORMING OF AMERICAN SOCIETY 14 
(1960). 
53. S ee, e.g., 'I'YACK, JAMES & B ENAVOT, supra note 41; KAESTLE, supra note 44; 
LAWRENCE CREMIN, AMERICAN EDUCATION: THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, 1783-1876 
(1980) [here inafter THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE) ; LAWRENCE CREMIN, AMERICAN 
EDUCATION: THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, 1607-1783 (1970) [hereinafter THE COLONIAL 
EXPERIENCE). 
54. For an example of its use in larger, synthetic his tories, see DANIEL WALKER 
HOWE, WHAT HATH GOD WROUGHT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICA, 1815-1848, at 
449-55 (2007) . 
55. See, e.g., MARTHA C . NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN D EFENSE OF 
AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 214- 21 (2008); NOAH FELDMAN, 
DIVIDED BY GoD: AMERICA'S CHURCH-STATE PROBLEM- AND WHAT WE SHOULD DO 
ABOUT IT 57-llO (2005) [hereinafter DIVIDED BY GOD}; Michael Newson, Common 
School Religion: Judicial Narratives in a Protestant Empire, ll S . CAL. lNTERDISC. L.J. 
219 (2002); John E. Jeffries & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment 
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REV. 279 (2001). 
56. See, e.g., WILLIAMS ROSS, FORGING NEW FREEDOMS: NATIVISM, EDUCATION, 
AND THE CONSTITUTION, 1917- 1927 (1996); Eric DeGroff, State Regulation of Nonpublic 
Schools: Does the Tie Still Bind?, 2003 B.Y.U. EDUC. & L.J. 363 (2003); Edward 
Gaffney, Jr., Pierce and Parental Liberty as a Core Value in Educational Policy, 78 U. 
DET. MERCY L . REV. 491 (2001); Jay S. Bybee, Substantive Due Process and Free 
Exercise of Religion: M eyer, Pierce and the Origins of Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 887 (1996). For a contemporary treatment of these issues, see JAMES DWYER, 
RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS V. CHILDREN'S RIGHTS (1998); ROBERT KUNZMAN, GRAPPLING WITH 
THE GOOD (2006); Rob Reich , Opting Out of Education: Yoder, Mozert, and the 
Autonomy of Children , 52 EDUC. THEORY 445 (2003). 
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for First Amendment scholarship. Scholars of the Religion 
Clauses often overlook the significance of educational practices. 
For example, while it is true that, as a leading scholar 
observed, "by 1834, no state in the Union would have an 
established church,"57 states continued to support and to 
regulate religious education long past 1834, until the end of the 
nineteenth century. As is now well documented in historical 
scholarship, the common school system, which was created 
during this period, was, in effect, state-sponsored Protestant 
education, replete with singing hymns, reciting prayers, and 
reading the King James Bible-as well as discrimination and 
violence directed towards non-Protestants. For this reason, it is 
hard to regard "universal disestablishment" as evidence that by 
1834 "the tradition of separation between church and state 
would seem an ingrained and vital part of our constitutional 
system."58 How could that be, when the school system-then 
the country's largest and most successful bureaucracy, short of 
the military-was devoted to inculcating sectarian religious 
beliefs?59 Even after universal disestablishment, states offered 
denominational instruction in public schools and funded many 
parochial schools. 60 
Even where legal scholars take note of the history of 
education, they often paint only a partial picture. Again, First 
Amendment scholarship provides an illustration. Our 
educational practices pose a challenge for scholars of the First 
Amendment because they do not fit neatly into the leading 
accounts of religious liberty. Accounts of the Religion Clauses 
can be divided into equality theories and liberty theories. 61 
57. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free 
Exercise of Religion, 10.'3 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 14.'37 (1990). 
58. !d. 
59. See infra Part III. 
60. See KAESTLE, supra note 44 , at 167 (describing the use of public funds to 
support Catholic schools and observing, "[t]he idea of separation of church and state 
with regard to education did not spring full-blown from the United States Constitution. 
It was a public policy developed gradually and unevenly at the local level during the 
nineteenth century."). 
61. This distinction is not intended to be exha ustive. Nor is it the only possible 
distinct ion between differ ent accounts of our religious liberties. For example, another 
common distinction is between voluntarism, or separatism, and nonpreferentialism . 
KATHLEEN SULLIVAN, FIRST AMENDMENT LAW 495, 507 (200.'3). The vo1untarism-
nonpreferentialism distinction shar es elements in common with liberty theory-equality 
theory distinction. But there are differences between the distinctions as well. Most 
notably, the voluntarism-nonpreferentialism distinction is, a t its core, a doctrinal 
distinction, while the liberty theory-equality theory dist inction is best descr ibed as a 
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According to equality theories, the purpose of the Religion 
Clauses is to preserve political equality by protecting members 
of minority religions from members of majority religions. To 
take the most prominent example, Justice O'Connor defends an 
equality theory of the Establishment Clause, under which the 
clause constrains the public display of religious symbols. She 
first introduced the equality theory in her concurrence in 
Lynch u. Donnelly.62 Lynch concerned an Establishment Clause 
challenge to a Christmas display in a city park.63 Writing for 
the Court, Justice Burger applied Lemon u. Kurtzman a nd 
upheld the display. In her concurrence, Justice O'Connor 
attempted to refocus Lemon. She suggested that, at its core, the 
Establishment Clause prohibited the government from making 
religion relevant to political standing.64 The government would 
offend this principle if it indicated that Christians were 
members of a favored, inside group, and non-Christians 
disfavored outsiders.65 O'Connor argued that the city display in 
Lynch did not communicate such a message. The variety of 
symbols in the display suggested the celebration of a shared, 
public holiday, not religious favoritism. 66 In broader terms, the 
public display left undisturbed the political equality of 
Christians and non-Christians. Justice O'Connor's equality 
theory thus articulates a limit on public displays of religious 
symbols.67 
Martha Nussbaum defends a broader version of the 
equality theory, arguing that both the Establishment Clause 
and the Free Exercise Clause are best understood in terms of 
political equality. 68 Moreover, unlike Justice O'Connor in 
Lynch,69 Nussbaum defends her equality theory on historical 
grounds. According to Nussbaum, history shows that the 
"dominant American political tradition" rejects "in-group" 
distinction between competing political values. 
62. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U .S. 668, 687 (1984); Noah Feldman, From Liberty to 
Equality: The Transform ation of the Establishment Clause, 90 CAL. L. REV. 67::l , 694 
(2002) [h ereinafter Liberty to Equality]. 
6:1. Lynch, 465 U.S . at 671- 72. 
64. ld. at 672 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)). 
65. ld. at 687- 88. 
66. Id. at 688. 
67. The court endorsed O'Connor's equality theory of the Establishment Clause in 
County of Allegheny v. ACLU. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
68. NUSSBAUM, supra note 55, at 16. 
69. Liberty to Equality, supra note 62, at 694. 
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favoritism and embraces religious equality_7° In particular, the 
American tradition connects political equality with a special 
regard for the conscience. The individual conscience is unique, 
valuable and vulnerable; it is the means by which individuals 
search for what is ultimately valuable in life.7 1 A society that 
purports to treat people as equals thus ought to accord the 
conscience of each individual equal respect and afford it some 
protection against governmental encroachment. While equal 
respect in matters of conscience does not mean conceding the 
truth of others' religious beliefs,72 it does require placing 
restrictions on the public display of symbols (as O'Connor's 
equality theory did), as well as accommodation from some laws 
that impinge on religious beliefs and conduct. 
Liberty theorists take a different view of the meaning of the 
Religion Clauses. Under the liberty theory, the purpose of the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses is to protect liberty of 
conscience, not political equality. 73 For example, Noah Feldman 
rejects the view of equality theorists that the Establishment 
Clause was designed to protect religious minorities from 
persecution by majorities, a paradigmatic violation of political 
equality. 74 Instead, according to Feldman, both the 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses aim to protect 
individuals from coercion.75 Coercion is problematic because of 
the special role the conscience plays in the formation of 
religious beliefs. The conscience, according to this view, informs 
us of our religious duties. Neither the church nor the state has 
the power to change what conscience dictates. Since individuals 
cannot consent to compulsion in matters of conscience, a 
government whose power derives from the consent of the 
governed has no authority to coerce in matters of conscience. 76 
According to Feldman, the founders drew on the liberty of 
conscience in their resistance to the use of tax receipts to fund 
establishment churches. Imposing a tax to support a religious 
70. NUSSBAUM, supra note 55, at 2~5. 
71. Id. at 52~53. 
72. Id. at 23. 
73. Nussbaum's equality theory also made use of the notion of conscience. But 
unlike Nussbaum's equality theory, in which preserving political equality is the reason 
we protect individual choices in matters of conscience, liberty theories explain religious 
protections in terms of the value of conscience itself. 
74. Liberty to Equality, supra note 62, at 682~83. 
75. DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at 48. 
76. Id. at 27~28. 
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institution or official whom one does not support, they argued, 
violates liberty of conscience. 77 The scope of both the 
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause reflects 
just this concern; where coercion against conscience is not at 
issue-for example, in the public display of religious symbols-
constitutional protections are not implicated. 78 
However, the history of education supports neither a pure 
equality theory nor a pure liberty theory. For example, consider 
the common school system, the forerunner of today's public 
school system. In the cities, the common schools evolved from 
charity schools run by urban churches and religious voluntary 
associations.79 These organizations provided free schooling to 
the children of the poor on the theory that it was necessary to 
intervene between the parent and the child to save the child 
from a life of poverty.80 Intervention was accomplished by 
schooling. The curriculum was strongly moral and religious, 
and included instruction in the sponsoring denomination's most 
basic commitments and practices. The common schools that 
emerged from the charity schools largely adopted the same 
philosophy. They aimed to impose on children a common 
religious and moral character, while preparing them to live in a 
democracy and "Americanizing" the newly arrived immigrants, 
many of whom were Catholics.81 At a theoretical level, then, 
the common school system and its predecessors were 
thoroughly republican: their express aim was to instill "virtue" 
in the attending children, not to respect individual rights. 82 
77. ld. at 32. 
78. Strangely enough, Ma dison believed that assessments in support of 
established churches, which allowed the taxpayer to elect a recipient, a lso violated the 
liberty of conscience. Irving Brant, Madison: On the Separation of Church and State, 8 
WM. & MARY Q. 4, 12 (1951) . Feldman a rgues in DIVIDED BY GOD that, for the same 
reason , nonpreferentialism- the public support of religious activities in a way that 
expresses no preference between them-viola tes the liberty of conscience. Thus 
Feldman's version of the liberty theory would in fact rule out nonpreferential programs 
of public support for religion. Despite its pedigree, this argument is subtle at best. It is 
not apparent that a liberty theory of the Esta blishment Clause would be required to 
reject nonpreferentia l public support of religion. Of course, an equality theory of th e 
Establishment Clause would likely rej ect nonpreferential public support of religion. 
The equality theory is sensitive to the poli tical status of nonbelievers as well as 
believers; even if public support was nonpreferential among religious groups, by 
definition it expresses a preference between religion and non-religion. 
79. See infra Part II . C. 
80. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 32-33; see infra Parts II. C. & III.B. 
81. See infra Part Ill . B. 
82. "The republican style of American education was compounded of four 
fundamental beliefs: that education was crucial to the vitality of the Republic; that a 
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Protestantism supplied those virtues. Indeed, schooling could 
not have accomplished its purpose had it been impermissible to 
impose favored religious beliefs. 
The practice of imposing favored religious beliefs threatens 
both liberty of conscience and political equality. As a result, 
liberty theorists and equality theorists may tend towards a 
version of America's educational history that emphasizes 
respect for liberty of conscience and political equality and 
downplays inconsistent practices. But to understand the 
meaning and scope of our religious liberties, we must 
acknowledge the history of our efforts to influence matters of 
conscience and to tie religion to political standing. Liberty 
theories and equality theories may be able to acknowledge 
these practices, but doing so will surely require a modification 
of their central claims. 
* * * 
proper republican education consisted of the diffusion of knowledge, the nurturance of 
virtue (including patriotic civility), a nd the cultivation of learning; that schools and 
colleges were the best agencies ... ; and that the most effective means of obtaining the 
requisite number and kind of schools was through some system tied to the polity." THE 
NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 148. See also note 105 and accompanying 
text. 
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This article proceeds in four parts. In Part II, the article 
discusses the importance that the founders ascribed to formal 
education, focusing on the significance of public virtue and 
homogeneity. This part also contrasts ambitious plans for state 
systems of free schools proposed by Thomas Jefferson and 
Benjamin Rush with the actual schooling practices of the 
period, which were variegated and subject almost exclusively to 
local control. In Part III, the article discusses the rise of the 
common school system in the early nineteenth century, 
focusing on the social changes that gave new force to old 
arguments for systematic, free schooling, as well as the 
religious content of the common school curriculum. This 
discussion highlights important changes introduced by common 
school reformers to the educational theories of the founders. 
Part IV of the article discusses the most important source of 
resistance to common school reform-the Catholic school 
movement. Catholics transformed educational practices by 
creating their own schools, contesting the use of public funds, 
and challenging the overtly Protestant content of the common 
school curriculum. Each of these disputes was important in 
shaping public education and religious education. Part V of the 
article returns to the themes of the Introduction and assesses 
the significance of the history of education for courts and for 
First Amendment scholarship. 
II. EARLY AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL THEORY AND PRACTICE 
A. The Context of American Education 
The earliest plans for formal schooling in America arose in 
an educational context very different than today. In 
seventeenth century England, education took place almost 
exclusively in the home, the community, and the church.83 
These institutions provided informal instruction, consisting 
mostly of basic socialization, moral instruction, and vocational 
training. Personal enrichment and scholarship were, in 
contrast, of very little concern. 84 Formal education was carried 
out in institutions outside the home and church, predominantly 
in English grammar schools and universities . Surprisingly, 
83. See BAILYN, supra note 52, at 15- 18. 
84. !d. 
286 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2009 
personal enrichment and scholarship were not the focus of 
formal education either. Instead, like informal education, 
formal education was predominantly utilitarian; for example, 
reading and writing led to literacy, which had economic and 
social value for nearly everyone. 85 Utility also formed the basis 
of the limited state interest in education-an interest that was 
expressed primarily in terms of control, rather than subsidy. 
As Bernard Bailyn put it, the state was "exhortatory, 
empowering, supervisory, [and] regulatory," but "neither 
initiating nor sustaining."86 Instead of enjoying public financial 
support, most schools relied on private gifts. 87 
In America, English educational practices quickly changed, 
due to the challenges of settling a new land. America was a 
wilderness, and in the wilderness many of the social structures 
that supported informal education in England simply did not 
exist, or failed. 88 For example, the demands of settlement 
undermined parental authority, since children were hardier 
and more adaptable, and thus possessed a natural advantage 
over their older parents. The need for parents to engage in 
menial labor and the starvation the colonists often faced also 
damaged parental stature. 89 Colonists understood the failure of 
the parental authority and other social structures as a moral 
indictment of their life in the new world. The Puritans of 
Massachusetts Bay took this indictment particularly seriously 
and, in response, transformed implicit, informal and moderate 
norms into explicit, formal and severe regulations, many of 
which regulated the most intimate matters of family life. 90 
Around 1663, Jonathan Mitchell explained: "We in this 
country, being far removed from the more cultivated parts of 
the world, had need to use utmost care and diligence to keep up 
learning and all helps to education among us, lest degeneracy, 
barbarism, ignorance and irreligion do by degrees break in 
upon us."91 
85. See THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, a t 176 (describing how the 
incr eased availability of schooling in seventeenth century Engla nd led to an increase in 
the literacy rate). 
86. BAILYN, supra note 52, a t 20. 
87. !d. 
88. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, a t 135, 176-77; BAILYN, supra 
not e 52, at 22. 
89. BAILYN, supra note 52, a t 22. 
90. !d. at 23. 
91. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 177 (quoting Jonathan 
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The threat of "barbarism" in colonial America led to two 
major changes in traditional educational practices. First, 
formal education became more important than it previously 
had been. Schools began to provide the moral instruction that 
had previously been carried out wholly in the home and church. 
Massachusetts Bay illustrates this development.92 There, 
colonists began to establish free primary schools for the moral 
instruction of children in 1635, within about five years of their 
arrival.93 Twelve years later , in 164 7, the Massachusetts 
General Court passed the School Act, requiring towns with a 
population over 50 to establish primary schools, and towns 
with a population over 100 to establish grammar schools.94 
These schools were financed by a variety of means, including 
rents, taxes, subscription fees, donations of land, grants, and 
private tuition.95 Connecticut and Plymouth passed similar 
laws shortly thereafter.96 
Second, the state (in this case, the colonial government) 
began to regulate educational practices inside the home.97 
Massachusetts Bay again provides an example. Among its 
many other regulations of family life, the colony required 
families to provide children the kinds of vocational and moral 
instruction they had previously provided in England.98 To be 
sure, while there existed penalities for breaking these laws, 
little evidence exists that the laws were enforced.99 
Nevertheless, the laws mark an early expression of state 
interest in moral and religious education, and in the state's 
Mitchell , A Modell for the Maintaining of S tudents and Fellows of Chaise Abilities at 
the Colledge in Cambridge, PUB!,ICA'fJONS OF THE COLONIAL SOCIETY OF 
MASSACHUSETTS XXXI, 311 (1935)). 
92. Of course, one ca nnot usually generalize from Massachusetts Bay to the other 
colonies. There were important differences between the educational practices of 
Virginia, Ma ssachusetts, and New York. However, since the practices of this period are 
not the focus of this paper, I omit these differences . See THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, 
supra note 53, at 9- 20, 176--91. 
93. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 180. 
94. ld. at 181- 82. 
95. See id. at 181, 184, 193. 
96. /d. at 182. 
97. /d. at 176; see BAILYN, supra note 52, at 23. 
98. BAILYN, supra note 52, at 23-24; see THE COLONJAI, EXPERIENCE, supra note 
53, at 124- 25. 
99. See THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, wpra note 53, at 126 ("These laws relating to 
household education are best viewed as essentially normative but only partially 
descriptive, and we shall never know precisely the extent to which they were actually 
honored or ob eyed.") . 
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willingness to supplant the family when it perceived a threat of 
breakdown. 100 
Two breakdowns in particular threatened the colonists. 
First, in Massachusetts Bay, colonists were acutely sensitive to 
the risk of moral breakdown. 101 Second, in both Massachusetts 
and Virginia, colonists were sensitive to the risk of social and 
political breakdown, starvation, and the failure of the 
settlement. 102 By posing these dangers of breakdown, the 
wilderness of America transformed education into a "matter of 
public concern," implicating the interests of the state in a new 
way. 103 This in turn led to greater state involvement and less 
familial control over the education of youth. This same impetus 
and change exist in both the founding and antebellum periods. 
In both periods, concerns over political and social instability 
give risk to assertions of state control over education. Of 
course, for obvious reasons, the founders were deeply concerned 
with political and social instability. They articulate these 
dangers, however, in a language different from the language of 
the colonists of Massachusetts Bay-the language of 
republicanism. 
B. Educational Theory and Reform in the Founding Period 
1. Formal education and virtue 
The founders believed that formal education was of central 
importance to republican government. At a general level, there 
appears to have been broad agreement that this was because 
100. See BAILYN, supra note 52, a t 26-27; TH E COLONIAL EXPERli!:NC E, supra note 
53, a t 126. 
101. See THE COLONIAL EXPEHI ENCE, supra note 53, a t 163, 176- 77 (describing the 
threat of "satanic barbarism" posed by the wilderness); id. at 18 1 (quoting the School 
Act, which argued that education was necessary to enable individuals to read the 
Bible); see also id. at 15- 16 (observing tha t the Puritans "were seeking to de monstra te 
to t he world at large the nature a nd practicability of a divinely order Christia n 
commonwealth . . .. [W]ithin such a society education would assume ut most importance 
... a s an agency for deliberately pursuing a cultura l idea l."). 
102. See id. at 18-14 (di scussing early English attempts a t colonization in Virginia 
and noting, "by 1622, it had become a ppa rent that the English experience in the New 
World would be funda mentally different than the Spanish, that its success would be 
tied to the development of self·sufficient a gricultural and trading communities, that 
self· sufficiency would sooner or later require the planting of fa milies, a nd that the 
pla nting of fa milies would be facilitated by [educational] institutions likes those of 
England .''). 
103. THE COLO:-.J IAL EXPEIUENCE, supra note 53, at 198. 
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formal education functioned to impart virtue to students. 104 Yet 
there were different views of why virtue was significant in a 
republic. For example, according to the view of republicanism 
dominant in America before the Revolution, virtue was 
necessary for the survival of republics because it ensured the 
obedience of citizens to legal authority. 105 In a monarchy, the 
"magnificence" and power of the monarch so impressed his 
subjects that they obeyed law out of fear. But in a republic, the 
rulers were servants of the citizens they ruled. Legislators 
possessed neither the magnificence of the monarch nor his 
power, since they governed only by the consent of the people 
and could b~ removed by them. 106 For the republic to survive, 
the people simply had to be willing to obey the laws. This 
required a sense of public virtue, of sacrificing one's private 
interests to the common good. If a republic's citizens were not 
virtuous, it would descend into licentiousness or anarchy. 107 
Some of the founders clearly believed that formal education 
was necessary to ensure that a republic's laws were obeyed. In 
a relatively late statement of this view, Benjamin Rush argued 
that public education ought to teach a pupil that: 
he does not belong to himself, but that he is public property. 
Let him be taught to love his family, but let him be taught, at 
the same time, that he must forsake and even forget them, 
when the welfare of his country requires it .... He must love 
private life, but he must decline no station, however public or 
responsible it may be, when called to it by the suffrages of his 
fellow citizens .... He must love character, and have a due 
sense of injuries , but he must be taught to appeal only to the 
laws of the state, to defend the one, and punish the other. 108 
According to the pre-revoluntionary Whig, representative 
104. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 8. 
105. GORDON 8. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 
66 (2d. ed. 1998). 
106. ld. 
107. See id. at 67-68. 
108. BENJAMIN RUSH, A PLAN FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF PUBLIC SCHOOLS AND 
THE DIFFUSION OF KNOWLEDGE IN PENNSYLVANIA 20-21 (1786), quoted in David Tyack , 
Forming the National Character: Paradox in the Educational Thought of the 
Revolutionary Generation, 36 HARV. ED. REV. 29, 34 (1966); see also KAESTLE, supra 
note 44, at 4-5 ("How, then, were [Americans] to escape the degeneration into anarchy 
that they believed was the inevitable fate of pure democracies? ... Political theorists 
were therefore concerned not only with protecting liberty . . ., but also with 
maintaining order .... Education could play an important role in reconciling freedom 
and order.") . 
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bodies would naturally pass laws that promoted the common 
good. 109 A virtuous individual would recognize the good in the 
legislature's laws and would be inclined, because of his public 
virtue, to set aside his narrow private interests in favor of the 
common interest. 110 Public virtue would thus imbue citizens 
with an internal inclination to follow the law. 111 
Later statements often reflect a different understanding of 
the significance of formal education for a republic. As Bernard 
Bailyn and Gordon Wood have shown, the republicanism of 
American Whigs was under heavy pressure during the 1 770s 
and 1780s, and many aspects of their ideology drifted. 112 
Changes in republicanism may have affected the public 
discourse about formal education. A broad set of views emerged 
about the relationship between formal education and 
government. 
First, some founders argued that formal education was 
essential for preparing republican leaders. 113 According to 
Jefferson, writing in 1818, one of the objects of higher 
education was to "form the statesmen, legislators and judges, 
on whom public prosperity and individual happiness are so 
much to depend." 114 Education would do this by making leaders 
well informed. "[W]here government is in the hands of the 
people," observed Noah Webster, "knowledge should be 
universally diffused by means of public schools. Of such 
consequence is it to society that the people who make laws 
should be well informed that I conceive no legislature can be 
justified in neglecting proper establishments for this 
purpose." 115 Being well informed, to be sur.e, was in part a 
scholarly accomplishment, but it was a normative one as well. 
109. WOOD, supra note 105, at 56. 
110. WooD. supra note 105, at 68. 
111. Encouraging respect for the law was hardly the only republican line of 
thought about education with which the founders would have been familiar. Locke's 
theory that education was necessary for a n informed consent to government, and that 
most people were improvable by education, was of course well known. See THE 
COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 419-421, 439. Robert Molesworth's work, An 
Account of Denmark, As It Was in the Year 1692, emphasized the importance of an 
education in public virtue to preserving liberty and preventing tyranny. ld. at 425. 
Founders' views of education reflected both theses. 
112. See BAILYN, supra note 52, at 45- 49; WOOD, supra note 105, at 46-90. 
11 3. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 6. 
114. REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONERS FOR THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGI:-JIA (Aug. 1-4, 
1818), quoted in THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 111 (1980). 
115. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 24. 
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Schools were to serve as "nurseries of wise and good men," 
educating future leaders so that they could later perceive the 
common good. 116 An education in virtue was thus necessary to 
prepare leaders. 117 
Second, many regarded education as crucial to the 
substantive reform of the people themselves. 118 According to 
this line of thought, the people had to be improved for 
republican government to survive. 119 This was necessary to 
protect the government from the vicissitudes of the people.120 
Washington emphasized this point in his Farewell Address. 
Arguing that future governments should provide "institutions 
for the general diffusion of knowledge," Washington observed, 
"In proportion as the structure of a government gives force to 
public opinion, it is essential that public opinion should be 
enlightened." 121 Jefferson also expressed concern that public 
opinion be educ~ted, in order to "give a wholesome direction" to 
the force which served as the ultimate guardian of public 
welfare .122 Demographic changes in America served to heighten 
this concern. While in Jefferson's mind the yeoman farmer was 
naturally virtuous, immigration was already signaling his 
relative decline, and those now entering the country could not 
be assumed to be naturally virtuous. 123 Virtue and knowledge 
were especially important if citizens were to instruct their 
representatives, as was sometimes the practice; 124 but they 
were also important for even the indirect exercise of popular 
116. ld. at 23; KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 6. 
117. This proposition stands somewhat in tension with traditional republican 
theory. On that theory, the common good was public welfare, and was determined by 
common consent. If the people were allowed to rule themselves, as was the case in a 
republic , they would almost a lways promote the common good. To imagine that the 
legislature might act against the common good was nearly a contradiction . See WOOD, 
supra note 105, at 56. Why such a body would need a virtuous leader is unclear. 
118. DIVIDED BY Goo, supra note 55, at 58-59. 
119. Id.; TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 14 ("One way to save 
republican government from the uninstructed minds a nd unruly wills of t he people was 
to educate the citizens correctly-that is, to instill proper civic beliefs and mold upright 
individual character."). 
120. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 15. 
121. Washington 's Farewell Address (1796), available at 
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/1 8th_century/washing.asp. 
122. ROBERT M. HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION 180 
(1962) ; cf THE FED ERALIST No. 49 (James Madison) ("[I]t is the reason, alone, of the 
public that ought to controul and regulate the government. 'fhe passions ought to be 
controuled and regulated by the government.") . 
123. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 5. 
124. See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 24. 
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control, since education was necessary for citizens to vote 
intelligently. 125 As Benjamin Rush saw it in 1785, what 
republicanism required was that individuals set aside their 
local interests for the common good; education could make this 
possible by turning men into "republican machines." 126 
Third, a formal education was also necessary to protect "the 
people" from the excesses of government. This line of reasoning 
had long been applied outside the context of republican 
government: education served to protect the people against a 
demagogue attempting to upset the historical, customary 
"constitution," and, conversely, ignorance served a demagogue's 
ends. 127 But the dysfunction of state legislatures in the 1780s 
suggested to the founders that an education in virtue was 
necessary even to limit the excesses of a republican 
legislature. 128 Contrary to the traditional republican theory, 
under which the only danger attendant to republican 
government was licentiousness or anarchy, a government of the 
people in fact also posed a danger of tyranny. 129 Education was 
necessary for the people to resist. Thus, in the preamble to his 
Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, first proposed 
in the Virginia Assembly in 1778, Jefferson suggested that 
even the people of a republic would require education so that 
they could recognize and resist "ambition under all its 
shapes." 130 As Jefferson then understood it, even republican 
government could tyrannize the people. 131 
2. The school system and homogenity 
More important than any of these particular theories, 
however, was the goal of transforming the haphazard and 
highly localized schools prevalent at the founding into a school 
125. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 5. 
126. WOOD, supra note 105, at 426; TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 
34. 
127. See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 25 (quoting Justice Joseph 
Story in On the Science of Government as a Branch of Popular Education, in THE 
INTRODUCTORY DISCOURSE AND THE LECTURES DELIVERED BEFORE THE AMERICAN 
INSTITUTE IN BOSTON, AUGUST 1834 248-75 (Boston, 1835)). 
128. Cf. WOOD, supra note 105, at 426 (discussing the need to educate the people to 
cure vice, but not differentiating between excesses of government and vicissitudes of 
popular opinion). 
129. ld. at 62 . 
130. Thomas J efferson, A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, ~ 1 
(1778), available at http:/loll.libertyfund.org/title/755/86186. 
131. See THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 439. 
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system. As the founders saw it, some form of common, 
institutionalized education was necessary to homogenize the 
citizens of America's broadly diverse and distant regions.m 
Montesquieu's well known theory required republics to be 
small and homogenous, to ensure that the interests of the 
citizens would be roughly similar. 133 America, in contrast, was 
neither small nor homogenous. 134 Already by 1785, Jefferson 
expressed the worry that immigration was turning the 
Confederation into a "heterogeneous, incoherent, distracted 
mass." 135 Moreover, the colonies differed from each other in 
striking ways, from climate and culture to economy. The 
founders understood that these differences could produce 
divergent political interests. 136 As Shay's rebellion m 
Massachusetts evidenced, even within one state, such 
differences could boil over into overt hostility. 137 
Creating a shared national identity strong enough to 
support loyalty to the republic was thus a central concern. 
Washington, for example, suggested that "[t]he more 
homogenous our citizens can be made in [principles, opinions, 
and manners], the greater will be our prospect of permanent 
union." 138 Textbook authors sought to contribute to 
homogeneity by standardizing American English spelling and 
pronunciation, as Webster famously did in The American 
Spelling Book. 139 However, the centerpiece of the effort, 
132. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 4- 5. 
133. See MONTESQUIEU, SPIRIT OF THE LAWS, Of the Corruption of the Principles of 
the Three Governments bk. 8, ch. 16; WOOD, supra note 105, at 356. 
134. But see THE FEDERALIST No. 14 (James Madison) (comparing the current 
dimensions of the country to European countries with representative systems). 
135. Thomas Jefferson, Notes on the State of Virginia 156--57 (1785), quoted in THE 
NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 117 (1980); see also DIVIDED BY GOD, supra 
note 55, at 58 ("The common purpose necessary to sustain a republic called for shared 
knowledge and common moral values, neither of which could be taken for granted in a 
changing America."). Jefferson's concern seems relatively unobjectionable in the 
context of Montesquieu's theory of republics and the political problems faced by the 
framers. Nevertheless, this quotation is perhaps the first example of a sentiment that 
could be construed less positively, namely, as anti-immigrant and assimilationist. See 
infra Parts III.B. & V.B. 
136. See, e.g. , NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 295 (1966) 
(comments of James Madison, July 14) (discussing the "real division of interests" 
between free states and slave states) ; TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 28 
(discussing the heightened fears created by the westward expansion of the republic). 
137. JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF 
THE CONSTITUTION 33-34 (1996) ; KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 5. 
138. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 32. 
139. !d. at 32-33. 
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thought Jefferson, Webster, and Rush, should be a system of 
uniform schooling. 140 According to Rush, a system of uniform 
schooling "will render the mass of people more homogeneous, 
and thereby fit them more easily for uniform and peaceful 
government." 141 Both Jefferson and Rush proposed systems of 
state-administered schooling to serve this end, involving free 
primary schools, grammar schools (similar to secondary 
schools), state colleges, a university, and a library. 142 Along 
with Jefferson and Rush, Washington also believed that the 
federal government should establish and administer a national 
university-graduation from which, Rush suggested, might be 
required to serve in the federal government. 143 The view that 
systematic schooling was necessary to promote homogeneity 
and preserve the republic was widespread among the founding 
generation. 144 David Tyack has referred to the view that 
preserving liberty requires homogeneity as the "educational 
paradox" of the founding generation. 145 
3. Early plans for state education 
The interest in a uniform system of schools brought with it 
the first real plans for state control of education. 146 Thus, 
contrary to the recent suggestions of several legal scholars, the 
framers certainly did anticipate state-administered and state-
140. See THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 109-11; see also TYACK, 
JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 23- 24. 
141. BEN,JAMIN RUSH, ESSAYS, LITERARY, MORAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL 7-8 (2d ed . 
1806). 
142. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 104, 109, 116-17. The inclusion 
of secondary and post-secondary schooling shows that Jefferson (and Rush) believed 
there to be a significant state interest in higher education , contrary to the suggestion of 
the Supreme Court in Yoder. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 226 n.14 ("[l]t is clear that, so far 
as the mass of the people were concerned, [Jefferson] envisaged tha t a basic education 
in the 'three R's' would sufficiently meet the interests of the Sta te."). To be sure, 
Jefferson did not state that such education should be mandatory. 
143. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 37 (noting that the first six 
Presidents of the United States all called for such a university); cf. THE NATIONAL 
EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 127 (observing that some founders believed that the 
federal government did not have the power to establish a university). 
144. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENC E, supra note 53, at 124- 25 (discussing a 1795 
essay contest by the American Philosophical Society on education). 
145. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 41. 
146. In the 1630s, Massachusetts Bay established several schools (some of which 
were supported in part by public funds) , founded Harvard, and famously required 
households to teach basic skills, and towns over a certain population to maintain a 
school; however , the mandatory education laws were rarely enforced. THE COLONIAL 
EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 14- 16, 180-88. 
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funded school systems. 147 Plans put forward by Jefferson in 
Virginia and Rush in Pennsylvania envisioned an increased 
state presence in both school funding and curriculum. 148 For 
example, Jefferson's plan divided Virginia into educational 
"hundreds" or wards, and established a primary school in each 
hundred. 149 Attending primary school was to be free and tax-
supported for three years, and thereafter require payment of 
tuition. 150 The curriculum would consist of reading, writing, 
basic arithmetic, and history. 151 Some controls were placed on 
textbooks (they had to teach history), and teachers were 
appointed by "overseers," superintendent-like officials in 
charge of ten schools. 152 Jefferson's bill also established twenty 
higher grammar schools, to which tax-funded scholarships 
would be available for the best primary school students 
demonstrating need, and which would teach Latin and Greek, 
English grammar, geography and advanced arithmetic. 153 
Finally, scholarships would also be available for the best 
grammar school students to attend college at William and 
Mary. 154 Thus, Jefferson's bill included state taxes for 
schooling, set primary and grammar school curricula and 
restricted local control of textbooks and teacher hiring. In each 
respect, the plan differed from the practices of schooling 
dominant in America at the time. As Lawrence Cremin put it, 
Jefferson's plan represented an effort to transfer control of 
education outside the home from private religious 
organizations (mostly churches) to state organizations, the 
schools. 155 The state, thought Jefferson, was the most 
14 7. See NUSSBAUM, supra note 55, at 217- 18 ("When America's tradition of 
re ligious fairness got going, there were no public schools, and so the framers, not 
surpris ingly, had nothing to say about how public education could shape young citize ns 
for a society in which all are treated with equal respect."); DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 
55, at 56, 70- 71 ("If the framers had anticipated a forum in which the government 
would state, promulgate, and embody American values while teaching children its 
vers ion of the good life, they might have given constitutional attention to the role of 
religion in such a context."). 
148. For a brief description of the plans, see KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 8-9; THE 
COLONIAL EXPI-:RIENCE, supra note 53, at 440; THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 
53, at 107-17. 
149. A Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge, supra note 130, ~ 4. 
150. Id. at ~I 6. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at ~,1 6-7. 
15a. Id . at n 12-13, 16. 
154. Id. at ~ 19. 
155. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 442. 
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appropriate institution for imparting the kind of civic virtue 
necessary for the republic to survive. 156 
Virginia disagreed. Not seeing the need for such a system, 
the Virginia Assembly rejected Jefferson's bill six times, and 
Jefferson did not live to see the creation of a free primary 
school system. 157 Resistance centered around the property 
taxes required to fund the plan, as well as the alleged difficulty 
of administering it. 158 In 1818, nearly thirty years after A Bill 
for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge was first 
introduced, the state finally created a system of free schooling, 
but only for the poor. 159 This result was by no means unusual 
for the time. Benjamin Rush's reform proposal suffered a 
similar fate in Pennsylvania. 16° Coeval efforts by the state 
legislature to mandate free schooling in Massachusetts went 
unenforced; a law establishing local schools passed by the New 
York legislature was underfunded and lasted only four 
years. 161 While some states admitted to the Union at the turn 
of the century, such as Ohio, Indiana and Mississippi, included 
educational clauses in their state constitutions, the lang.uage 
was rhetorical, hortatory, or merely announced a broad 
educational purpose, without providing for specific school 
regulations. 162 The only successful state regulation of education 
occurred in Connecticut, where in 1795 the legislature created 
156. ld. 
157. The bill was rejected by the House in 1778; rejected by the House in 1780; 
rejected by the Senate in 1785; rejected by the House in 1786; passed in a modified, 
purely hortatory form, in 1796; and adopted in part and amended in part in 1818, 
creating the University of Virginia. See THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 
107-12. 
158. Id. at 108; KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 9. 
159. THE NATIONAL EXPERI ENCE, supra note 53, at llO. Notably, other parts of 
Jefferson's education plans were eventually realized . ld. at 112 ("By th e time of 
Jefferson's death in 1826, a substantial portion of his program for education had come 
to pass. The church h ad been disestablished ... ; a university had been found ed under 
public auspices; and a press that had consistently extended its freedom ... was dai ly 
performing its vital-if cacophonous-function of public enlightenment. But the great 
library at Richmond had not been built .... More importantly, perhaps, the system of 
free primary schools envisioned in the Bill for the More General Diffusion of 
Knowledge had not beer. establis hed."). 
160. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 9. 
161. Id. at 10. 
162. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 30, 54- 55. See OHIO CONST. OF 
1802, art. VIII, § 25; IND. CONST. OF 1816, art. IX; MISS. CONST. OF 1817, art. VI, § 16 
("Religion, morality and knowledge being necessary to good government, the 
preservation of liberty, and the happiness of mankind, schools, and the means of 
education, shall forever be encouraged in this State."). 
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a permanent school fund with receipts from the sale of the 
state's Western Reserve Territory.163 The resultant fund 
became so large that taxation proved unnecessary to support 
local schools after 1820. 164 Elsewhere, the dreaded enemy of 
the republic, localism, prevailed in the state legislatures. 165 
The resistance these proposals faced is, in some respects, 
unsurprising. After all, resistance to centralized control and 
taxation were firmly entrenched in the American politics of the 
revolutionary generation. 166 Local self-government was a 
central part of political liberty-the liberty that republicans 
believed education necessary to protect. 167 As Carl Kaestle put 
it, "The very devotion to liberty that schooling was designed to 
protect also made local citizens skeptical of new forms of 
taxation by the state, and of new institutional regulation by the 
central government." 168 Thus, the "republican" vision of a 
common, state-administered school ran headlong into a concern 
about liberty. 
Importantly, it does not seem to have been a concern with 
religious liberty that motivated the opposition. There is no 
evidence that founding-era school opponents were moved by the 
concerns that, as Michael McConnell has shown, led the 
Baptists and Presbyterians to support both state 
disestablishment and eventually the federal Free Exercise 
Clause.169 This is despite the fact that some of the early school 
proposals were expressly religious. Rush, for example, 
recommended the use of the Bible to give moral instruction and 
defended his school proposal on the grounds that it would be 
beneficial to religion. 170 However , while the textual sources 
proposed by Rush were religious, their significance was 
primarily civic; as Rush conceived of public schooling, its 
purpose was to educate future leaders, improve citizens, 
homogenize the population, and encourage individuals to act in 
ways that promoted the public good, rather than to 
163 . l<AESTLE, supra note 44, at 11. 
164. l d . 
165. See THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, a t 443. 
166. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 9. 
167. ld. 
168. ld. 
169. See McConnell, supra note 57, at 1439- 43. 
170. RUSH, sup ra note 108, at 1, 20- 21 , 82, 93-113 (describing the purpose of 
education). 
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proseyltize.171 For the most part, the political struggle over 
founding-era proposals for school reform seems to have focused 
not on the religious content of the schools, but on who 
controlled them: states or localities. 172 
There were more mundane sources of opposition to school 
plans as well. As David Tyack has argued, the Virginia planter 
society took a very different attitude towards education than 
did the religious communities of New England. 173 For planters 
hoping to be gentlemen, formal instruction was a means of 
polishing their character, and was of little utility to the 
plantation agricultural economy. 174 Thus, it would not have 
been in planters' interests to fund a state-administered 
primary school system175 Moreover, there was little agreement 
about the best means of providing for education and whether 
the existing institutions were sufficient. 176 In the latter- half of 
the eighteenth century, schooling remained ancillary to the 
education provided in the home and, to a declining extent, at 
church.177 What education demanded of the state was unclear. 
Taken together, the opposition-including the principled 
resistance to state taxes, the distrust of state government and 
preference for local control, the cultural role of education in 
Virginia in particular, and the doubtful necessity of state 
administration in education-proved too formidable a political 
barrier for the systematic educational reform that Jefferson 
and Rush envisioned. 
C. Educational Practices in the Early Republic 
In contrast to Jefferson's grand plans, the educational 
institutions dominant in the early republic were variegated and 
highly local. 178 The vast majority of schooling took place 
outside of urban centers. As the western edge of the country 
expanded in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries, people left cities and America became more rural. In 
1790, over ninety-five percent of Americans lived m 
171. See THE NATIONAL E XPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 139; see infra Part III . 
172. See THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53 , at 443; KAESTLE, supra note 
44, at 9-10, 22. 
173. DAVID L. TYACK, TURNING POINTS IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL HISTORY 34 
(1967). 
174. !d. 
175. !d. a t 28-49. 
176. TYACK, JAMES & B ENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 15. 
177. See THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 480, 49 1. 
178 . TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 26. 
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settlements of fewer than 2,500 people; by 1830, this was still 
true of ninety-one percent of the population. 179 In rural settings 
in the North and Midwest, the "district" school system 
predominated. 180 District schools were usually one-room 
clapboard houses built on unusable land, like a swamp or a 
fallow field.181 Children began attending school as young as two 
or three years of age. 182 Discipline appears to have been the 
primary focus for the youngest attendees, who were there 
mostly to free up their parents; but other students enjoyed a 
pedagogical mixture of rote memorization and copying 
examples. 183 Generally, one teacher taught all of the pupils. 
While they sometimes tried to separate children into classes 
based on the difficulty of their textbooks, this was difficult 
because families provided the textbooks, and they were often 
different among students of the same level. 184 Using spellers 
like Webster's or Thomas Dilworth's A New Guide to the 
English Tongue, students first memorized the alphabet, then 
strings of vowel-consonant syllables (like "ab, eb, ib, ob, ub") 
and one-syllable words. 185 When students could read, they read 
predominantly "authorized catechism"-selections from the Old 
and New Testaments-as well as "lore, counsel, and rhyming 
epigrams of a religious character." 186 The religious exercises 
and the teaching of foreign language varied from district to 
district, depending on majority preference. 187 Writing, 
arithmetic, and geography were also taught. 188 Discipline 
usually meant corporal punishment, which many teachers were 
"harsh and frequent" in administering. 189 
Funding was largely patchwork and varied from district to 
distric.t. School districts in the North and Midwest were 
financed in part by local property taxes, overhead and fuel 
179. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 13. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. at 13-15. 
182. Id. at 15- 16. 
183. Id. at 17. 
184. Id. 
185. ld. at 16; THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 500-01. 
186. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 501. 
187. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 17. 
188. ld. at 17; see also THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 501-05 
(describing the approach to teaching arithmetic, the rule of threes, as well as providing 
examples of the writing workbooks). 
189. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 13. 
300 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2009 
contributions, tuition payments, and state aid. 190 In some 
cases, teachers received their pay directly from patrons. 191 
Federal land grants for financing primary education were 
available to settlers in western states as early as the 1780s and 
90s, but early on, the system was marred by waste, 
mismanagement and corruption. 192 Schools in the South often 
charged "subscription" rates to the families of attending 
pupils. 193 In any case, the contemporary distinction between 
private and public schools did not exist, and methods of 
funding varied from community to community, depending on 
the political culture and the circumstances. 194 
Not only did localities effectively control curriculum and 
funding, they also controlled teaching. Teaching in th.e late 
eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was bad work. 195 
School was in session for only ten weeks during the winter and 
the summer, making it necessary for many teachers to find 
other work during the breaks. 196 In most cases, pay was poor, 
and turnover was high. Minimal training was required, and 
indeed teachers usually arrived with no qualifications 
whatsoever, sometimes only slightly better educated than their 
students. 197 In New York, for example, "some local 
communities had certified teachers who could not even add." 198 
According to one school reformer, speaking in 1842, "at least 
four fifths of the teachers in the common schools in Illinois 
would not pass an examination in the rudiments of our English 
education, and most of them [had] taken to teaching because 
they hadn't anything in particular to do." 199 But, free from 
state credentialing requirements or review, localities could hire 
whichever teachers they wanted.200 They exercised further 
control by boarding teachers with local families . Families used 
the opportunity not only to inquire, offer advice, and complain 
about school, but to "monitor" teachers' personal lives as 
190. ld. 
191. THE COLONIAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 500. 
192. See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 32, 38-40. 
193. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 13. 
194. ld. at 13. 
195. See id. at 20- 21. 
196. ld. at 20. 
197. ld. 
198. ld. at 21. 
199. ld. 
200. ld. at 22. 
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well. 201 Conditions were slightly different in the South, where 
itinerant schoolmasters predominated. Sometimes, itinerant 
teachers would arrive in town of their own accord, locate a 
schoolhouse, solicit pupils, and set tuition rates; elsewhere in 
the South, teachers were invited to town by parents to teach in 
the local "old-field" school.202 In all cases, however, parents in 
the early republic had broad control over the hiring of teachers. 
Parents used that control to select teachers whose religious 
beliefs and native language matched their own, to help 
maintain the cultural identity. 203 As a result, teachers did not 
need credentials to provide rural districts with the services 
they desired: rudimentary instruction and child care at a very 
low cost. 204 And in fact, the rural district school system was 
relatively well attended and the population enjoyed a high rate 
of literacy. 205 Between 1750 and 1835, rural enrollments-
already higher than those in urban schools-increased. 206 
Much like rural schooling, urban schooling before the 1820s 
involved a patchwork of different organizations, from boarding 
schools, tutors, and independent pay schools, to "dame schools" 
for young women, apprenticeship, and church charity 
schools.207 Most of the educational burden was met by the 
independent pay schools. 208 These schools charged fees within 
the reach of three-fourths of the city population, but tuition did 
exclude members of the working poor, such as day laborers, 
who could not afford the three to four dollar charge per 
quarter. 209 Church charity schools, and later Sunday schools, 
filled the gap.210 The earliest church charity schools were 
funded by donations and limited to children of the 
congregation's members.211 They taught rudimentary skills, 
focusing primarily on literacy, the memorization of scripture, 
201. Id. 
202. Id. a t 13. 
203. See id. at 17 (describing instruction in foreign languages and variations in 
religious exercises). 
204. Id. a t 20. 
205. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 26; KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 
24; see also THE COLONIAL EXPERJENCE, supra note 53, at 546. 
206. l<AESTLE, supra note 44, at 27. 
207. Id. a t 30- 31. 
208. Id. a t 30, 52. 
209. Id. a t 30, 53. 
210. !d. a t 30-31. 
211. !d. a t 31. 
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and the morality of the denomination.212 As city populations 
began to grow at the turn of the century, however, charity 
schools began to reach beyond the confines of their own 
congregation to the city poor.213 The voluntary associations, 
common in America at the time, played a large role in 
extending charity school services, using a combination of tax 
revenue and donations.214 In Philadelphia, for example , the 
Society for the Free Instruction of Female Children opened a 
school for poor girls in 1796.215 A similar group, the Female 
Association, opened a girls' school in New York in 1801.216 
Women were well represented in the educational voluntary 
associations, as were Quakers. Quakers dominated the New 
York Manumission Society, which opened a school for black 
children in 1787.217 Quakers also established the New York 
Free School Society in 1805, with the explicit aim to provide 
education for the city's poor on a much larger scale.218 
Employing the innovative Lancasterian pedagogy, in which 
older students taught younger students, the Free School 
Society was able to educate hundreds of students in its 
school.219 Nevertheless, until the 1830s, the independent pay 
schools continued to serve more children than the charity 
schools. 220 
The ideology of the charity schools was very different from 
that of the rural district schools and the urban independent 
pay schools. Whereas the district schools were controlled 
primarily by parents, who hired teachers, provided textbooks, 
and determined how long children would remain in attendance, 
charity schools were controlled by trustees, who sought to 
interpose the school between the the child and the parent.22 1 
According to Kaestle, charity schools were in fact "antagonistic 
21 2. ld. at 3 1~32. 
213. ld. at 32. 
214. !d. at 40. 
215. !d. 
21 6. Id. at 3 1~32. 
217. By 1810, "African free schools" s pread to cities in New J er sey, Rhode Island 
and Delaware. l d . a t 38. 
218. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 40. 
219. See id. at 40~4 1. 
220. ld. at 52. 
221. ld. at 39, 55 ("Unlike rural district schooling, urbal charity schooling was 
designed to intervene between parents and children , to introduce children to a culture 
and morality that refor mers believed was different tha n their parents."). 
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to the child's family and peer influences."222 Charity school 
trustees took this attitude because they believed poverty was a 
moral failing and that poor parents had become poor because of 
their bad character. They feared that, if left unaddressed, 
parents would impart character and habits to their children , 
who would remain impoverished.223 As the New York Daily 
Advertiser suggested in 1791, the poor "seldom keep any 
government in their families ," and their children "unavoidably 
contract habits of idleness and mischief and wickedness."224 
Widespread poverty would in turn generate the crime, social 
tension , and political disaffection increasingly characteristic of 
the cities .225 The solution was to break the cycle by replacing 
the influence of parents' influence with the morality of the 
church .226 
It was from the church-operated city charity schools that 
the American common school system developed. Common 
school reformers altered the republican theory of education by 
drawing on the ideas of the Second Great Awakening, 
transforming an education in public virtue to instruction in 
Protestant morals. In the 1830s, 40s and 50s, vast numbers of 
immigrant Catholics arrived in American cities. They objected 
to a progr am of moral education that was, in effect, Protestant. 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE COMMON SCHOOLS 
Although Jefferson and Rush's plans ultimately failed, the 
balance struck by state legislatures in favor of locally 
controlled schools and against free school systems was not 
222. l d . (emphasis added). 
223. Id. a t 32. 
224 . NF:W YORK DAILY ADVERTISER, Jan. 27, 1791, quoted in KAESTLE, supra note 
44, a t 32; Horace Ma nn, On Childhood in the Cities and the Fatherhood of God, in 
TURNING P OINTS IN AMERICAN EDUCATIONAL HISTORY 134-135 (David Tyack ed., 1967) 
("And as I see the poor and neglected children in the streets , or in their own wretched 
houses, a nd how t hey live and grovel in low practices, gradually losing the sweet 
innocence of infantile expression , and becoming coarse a nd violent , even brutal, I 
wonder still a t the tor pidity of society upon this subject . . .. The sort of education they 
get in cities , where life is stirr ing briskly around them, and each one seems scr a mbling 
to get the best morsel for himself, only ma kes them worse, unless something is done to 
evoke order for them out of this chaos.") . 
225. KA F:STLE, supra note 44, at 32-33, 36 (noting tha t leaders "jus tified charity 
schooling on groubds of stability") . 
226. Id. at 32- 33, 39 ("Education would h elp reduce crime and vice while it muted 
cultura l differences"); id. a t 4 7 ("One of the central goals of charity-school workers was 
to rescue chil dren from a n allegedly harmful family environment."). 
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immutable. Legislators' votes reflected, in part, a judgment 
that a state system was unnecessary, since the hodgepodge of 
district schools, itinerant schoolmasters, private tutors, and 
independent pay schools were doing the job.227 However, the 
assumptions on which this judgment rested proved unstable. 
Social circumstances were changing, and as they changed, they 
upset the judgment that state schooling was unnecessary. Two 
of these changes are especially significant. 
A. Westward Expansion and the Birth of Federal School 
Regulation 
First, westward expansion dramatically increased in the 
nineteenth century. Kentucky, Tennessee, and Ohio were 
admitted to the Union at the turn of the century; one year after 
Ohio became a state, the Louisiana Purchase vastly increasd 
the size of the country.228 Over the next sixty years, seventeen 
states joined the Union.229 The climate, geography, and 
resources of these new interior western states differed from the 
eastern states. Their economies differed as well; the West 
became an agricultural region (like the South), while, by the 
1840s, the Northeast had transformed into a manufacturing 
region.230 In addition, some of the people who settled the West 
were very different from the dominant ethnic and cultural 
groups of the eastern states. In the upper Midwest, for 
example, Wisconsin was settled in large part by German 
Catholics and Lutherans, some of whom immigrated together 
as entire communities and exhibited a strong interest in 
preserving their native language and culture. 231 These 
immigrants constituted a large portion of the state. By 1890, 
thirty-seven percent of Wisconsin's population was either born 
in Germany or had one parent born there.232 Together with the 
227. Id. at 9. 
228. See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 56; notably, the Louisiana 
Purchase was initially regarded as illegal by Spain and Britian , and was not 
acknowledged until 1819. HOWE, supra note 54, at 16, 108. 
229. See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 56. 
230. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 63 . 
231. See Thomas C. Hunt, The Bennett Law of 1890: Focus of Conflict Between 
Church and State in Education, 23 J. CHURCH & ST. 69, 84- 85 (1981). 
232. ld. at 85 (citing U.S. IMMIGRATION COMMISSION, REPORTS OF THE 
IMMIGRATION COMMISSION: STATISTICAL REVIEW OF IMMIGRATION, 1820-1910 -
DISTRIBUTION OF IMMIGRANTS, 1850-1900 522 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office 1911) [hereinafter IMMIGRATION]. 
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Irish, English and other immigrant populations, seventy-four 
percent of Wisconsin was either foreign-born or had at least 
one foreign-born parent. Wisconsin's immigrant population was 
considerable, but hardly extreme at the time; in 1890, the state 
ranked third in the number of eligible voters from foreign 
countries.233 
The differences between the expanding West and East 
raised old worries about obedience, loyalty, and mutual 
understanding between citizens and federal leadership in 
Washington.234 In response, both federal and state 
governments began to place more emphasis on schooling. 
Uniform school systems teaching a standard curriculum would 
impart American virtues and the English language, effectively 
homogenizing the next generation.235 Fully "Americanized," the 
new immigrant groups would feel greater loyalty to the union. 
As the U.S. House Committee on Public Lands put it in 1826, 
when it recommended that half of all proceeds from the sale of 
public lands go to funding common schools, education 
"improve[s] . . . the minds and morals of the present 
generation, and of generations to come"-an important task 
because it "contemplates giving additional stability to the 
government, and drawing round the republic new and stronger 
bonds of union." 236 So justified, all citizens had an interest in 
building in their states uniform systems of common schools for 
all children. 
The emphasis placed on schooling had legal ramifications at 
both the federal and state levels. At the federal level, land 
grants for public schooling became more common and better 
administered as the century progressed.237 School land grants 
had been part of the township system since the federal Land 
Ordinance of 1785, under which "lot 16" of a township was to 
be used "for the maintenance of public schools."238 Article III of 
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 also "encouraged" the citizens 
of the territory to establish "schools and the means of 
education."239 Nevertheless, before the turn of the century, 
233. ld. (citing IMMIGRATION, supra note 232, at 471). 
234. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 28. 
235. Jd. at 28-29. 
236. HOUSE COMMITTEE ON PUULLC L ANDS, 1826 REPORT, quoted in TYACK, JAMES 
& BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 28. 
237. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 21- 22. 
238. Jd. at 31. 
239. Northwest Ordinance of 1787, art. III. 
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school land grants were sometimes omitted, "mismanaged or 
squandered."240 At first, Congress viewed school land grants as 
bargaining chips to induce western settlement; when buyers 
failed to request them, Congress sometimes omitted the 
grants.241 Even when school grants were provided, few federal 
restrictions were imposed on their use, and the resources were 
often diverted to uses other than schooling.242 Townships , 
trying to decide whether to rent or sell the property, discovered 
that renters had little incentive to improve the property and 
that immediate sale of the land was often for very little 
money. 243 
By the latter part of the nineteenth century, this system 
had transformed in several important ways. Land buyers 
began to view public school grants as entitlements, and 
expected Congress to provide them in all sales.244 In 1848, 
Congress in fact increased the amount of land for schools from 
one lot to two lots, setting aside "5.5% of the public domain" in 
California for education.245 Congress began to provide new 
states with cash grants in addition to land, reserving a portion 
of proceeds from the sale of the public domain for use in state 
common school funds. 246 Administrative controls also evolved. 
In 1847, the Commissioner of Public Lands issued instructions 
detailing lawful means for selecting, registering and selling 
federal land grants for schools.247 The agency also began to 
hear and decide land grant disputes, as did the federal 
courts.248 Finally, Congress used gifting of the federal domain 
as a bargaining chip to implement policies it could not enact 
directly.249 Conditional land grants enabled the federal 
government to achieve changes in school policy at the state 
level, as well. 
Changes at the state level were felt first in constitutions, 
whose educational provisions grew in the nineteenth century 
from largely ineffectual rhetorical flourishes into explicit 
240. TYACK, J AMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , a t 21. 
241. Id. at 32. 
242. Id. at 38-40. 
243. Id. at 40-41. 
244. Id. at 34. 
245. Id. 
246. Id. 
247. Id. a t 37. 
248. Id. 
249. Jd. at 33. 
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controls on the use and sale of federal public land grants.250 By 
the second half of the nineteenth century, education 
regulations burgeoned, and states began to systematically 
regulate schooling. To understand this development, however, 
we need to consider a second major social change in the early 
nineteenth century United States. 
B. Urbanization and the Common School Movement 
1. Immigration and the growth of the city 
The second social change that helped to tilt the balance in 
favor of state-administered school systems was the growth of 
the American city.251 The growth of the city itself encompassed 
a cluster of changes, but most important was the dramatic 
increase in immigration between the 1820s and 1870s, in 
particular the immigration of Catholics from Ireland and 
Germany. 252 Catholics had not previously constituted a large 
segment of the population. In 1765, for example, there were 
approximately 25,000 Catholics in the English colonies, whose 
total population was around two million.253 Given the historical 
animosity between English Protestants and Catholics and the 
severe restrictions placed on Catholics by some colonial 
governments, this number is unsurprising. However, between 
the 1820s and 1850s, over two million Catholics arrived in the 
United States.254 
Many of these immigrants arrived very poor and illiterate, 
and some did not speak English at all. They differed ethnically 
and culturally from earlier American immigrants.255 The Irish 
Catholics settled mostly in cities,256 including Boston, New 
York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and further west in Detroit, St. 
250. Id. at 55. 
251. DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at 58 (2005); HOWE, supra note 54, at 454 
("What proba bly tipped the scales in favor of states assuming some responsibility for 
educa tion was the growth of cities and towns."). 
252. TIMOTHY WALCH, PARISH SCHOOL: AMERICAN PAROCHIAL EDUCATION FROM 
COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT 12 (1996). 
253. Id. 
254. See DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at 265-66 (discussing Irish immigration); 
cf WALCH, supra note 252, at 23 (putting total Catholic immigration around 5 million 
for this period) 
255. WALCH, supra note 252, at 24. 
256. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 376. 
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Louis, Cincinnati and Chicago.257 There they met many non-
immigrant families who had also recently come to the city, 
especially in the Northeast. Those born in America were drawn 
to the cities by the same factory jobs that attracted 
immigrants, and relocation to the city was made easier by 
recent advances in transportation infrastructure. 258 Together 
these forces filled the cities and altered national demographics. 
Between 1830 and 1860, the number of people living in cities of 
more than 2,500 grew from less than ten percent of the 
population to about twenty percent,259 rapidly increasing the 
population density of these areas. The increase in population 
density in turn served to heighten the problems of the city-
class and ethnic tension, poverty, disease, crime-and placed a 
severe strain on what social services existed.260 
Catholic immigration to the cities heightened old worries 
about social stability.261 In part, this was simply due to the 
sheer number of immigrants and the effect of increased 
population density on city life. 262 Many immigrants arrived in 
the country impoverished, placing an immediate strain on 
hospitals, almshouses, and the system of charity schools 
administered by churches and voluntary associations. 263 But 
more significantly, the Catholic immigrants of the 1820s-1870s 
were ethnically, culturally, and linguistically different from 
previous immigrants and from the population as a whole.264 
This newfound diversity triggered a number of reactions, 
including discord, discrimination, and outright violence 
257. Many German Catholic families settled in the country, although later German 
immigrants came to Milwaukee, St. Louis and Chicago. Chinese immigrants in the 
1860s and 1870s settled mostly in the far west. See THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra 
note 53, at 376. 
258. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 69. 
259. ld. at 63. 
260. See id. at 70 ("Population density in large cities increased tensions and made 
social problems more visible."). 
261. See id. at 79-80 ("Americans of the 1830s and 1840s inherited from the 
revolutionary generation an anxious sense of the fragility of republican government .. . 
. [T]here were new forces to fear ... manufacturing, foreign immigration, the decline of 
landholding, the fragmenta tion of Protestant r eligion, and the growth of cities."). 
262. Id. at 70 (discussing this issue separately). 
263. See id. 
264. ld. at 71-72 ("The presence of so many culturally alien people in antebellum 
America greatly reinforced the use of emerging public school systems to teach children 
a common English language and a common Protestant morality, much as earlier 
charity schools had been directed at those qualities of blacks or poor whites that 
educational reformers saw as undesireable or threatening."). 
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between immigrants and the American-born.265 
Discord in the cities proved a fertile ground for common 
school proposals. Drawing on republican theories of education, 
school reformers emphasized that a uniform system of schools 
would remove cultural conflict. 266 "Common schools" open to all 
would assimilate new immigrants and resolve potential 
divisions before they occurred. School thus presented a 
"peaceful and seemingly democratic solution" to the social 
threat posed by the new influx of immigrants.267 According to 
Horace Mann, appointed in 1837 to be Secretary of the newly 
created Massachusetts Board of Education, the common school: 
is capacious enough to receive and cherish in its parental 
bosom every child that comes into the world; and ... [offers] 
seasonable supplies of counsel and guidance making security 
antedate danger. Other social organizations are curative and 
remedial; this is a preventive and an antidote; they come to 
heal diseases and wounds; this is to make the physical and 
moral frame invulnerable to them. Let the common school be 
expanded to its capabilities, let it be worked with the 
efficiency of which it is susceptible, and nine tenths of the 
crimes in the penal code would become obsolete; the long 
catalogue of human ills would be abridge; men would walk 
more safely by day; every pillow would be more inviolable by 
night; property, life, and character held by stronW tenure; all 
rational hopes respecting the future brightened.26 
Mann's belief that common schools would "kindle a spirit of 
amity and mutual respect that the conflicts of adult life could 
never destroy" is a recognizable extension of the republican 
view that common, institutionalized education would 
homogenize the population and thereby generate the obedience, 
loyalty and mutual understanding necessary for the survival of 
a large republic.269 Yet, the public received Mann's theory with 
different ears than had the founding generation. Whereas 
earlier American generations did not see the need for a 
265. See, e.g., WALCH, supra note 252, at 26; KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 72. 
266. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 138; KAESTLE, supra note, at 72 
(noting that Protestants of the time, like Americans of other generations, "looked to 
public education to resolve cultural conflict."). 
267. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 72. 
268. HORACE MANN, COMMON SCHOOL JOURNAL, III 15 (1841), quoted in THE 
NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 137. 
269. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 99; THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 
138; see also KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 69- 70, 80. 
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common school system, the influx of immigrants and the 
growth of the city made Americans of the early nineteenth 
century more receptive. 
2. Religion and the common school movement 
Common school reformers also drew on the language and 
self-understanding of the contemporary religious revival in 
making their case.270 This is an essential difference between 
the common school movement and earlier plans for school 
reform. For example, where Jefferson and Rush believed that 
an education in public virtue was necessary to preserve 
republican government, Mann believed that it should be the 
schools' mission to impart moral rectitude. 271 The American 
Revolution, thought Mann, removed many political restraints 
on conduct. A moral reformation would be required to preserve 
the resulting system; without it, unchecked "human passion" 
would create anarchy and suffering. 272 Where Jefferson had 
described schooling's goal as imparting public virtue, or a 
disposition to promote the common good, Mann's descriptions 
were shot through with the Protestantism of the Second Great 
Awakening.273 As Lawrence Cremin describes it, "Mann's 
definition of what should be taught came remarkably close to 
the evangelical conceptions of the day-a common piety rooted 
in Scripture, a common civility revolving around the history 
and the state documents of a Christian Republic, and a 
common intellectual culture .... "274 Such an orientation was 
widespread among common school reformers-some of whom 
were ministers themselves.275 Teachers, the reformers argued, 
270. For a discussion of the Second Great Awakening, see generally HOWE, supra 
note 54. 
271. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 136, 138; KAESTLE, supra note 
44, at 82. 
272. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 138-39. 
273. Id. at 136-37, 139 ("In essence, Mann accepted the propositions of the 
republican style of educational thought and recast them in the forms of nineteenth· 
centu ry nondenominational Protestantism.") . Ma ny of the urba n common school 
reformers of the time associated their work with millennia lism as well. See KAESTLE, 
supra note 44, at 49, 94-95. 
274. THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 140; see also WALCH, supra 
note 252, at 26. 
275. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 96-99; see David Tyack, The Kingdom of God and 
the Common School: Protestant Ministers and the Educational Awakening in the West, 
36 HARV. ED. REV. 447, 447 (1966) ("Across the nation, but especially in the new 
communities of the west, ministers accepted the founding and superintendence of 
schools as a traditional religious duty."). 
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had a duty to impart the common Protestant morals of self-
control, deference, honesty, industry, frugality, and respect for 
private property and traditional family roles .276 
One result of the focus on Protestantism among school 
reformers was a strong and sometimes VICIOUS anti-
Catholicism.277 Of course, anti-Catholicism was not uncommon 
in America at the time. According to a popular Boston minister, 
for example, the Catholic church was "the ally of tyranny, the 
opponent of material prosperity, the foe of thrift, the enemy of 
the railroad, the caucus, and the school."278 But as Kaestle has 
shown, anti-Catholicism played a large role in the ideology of 
common school reformers , who regarded American 
Protestantism as being naturally superior.279 In the eyes of 
many reformers, Protestants were responsible for the economic 
progress and political liberty the nation enjoyed, and only 
Protestant values should be taught in the schools.280 
Common school reformers did attempt to remain neutral 
between Protestant denominations. Some of the strongest 
resistance to common school reform came from Protestants 
themselves.281 Denominations had multiplied during the 
Second Great Awakening, and minority denominations were 
concerned that the doctrine of other denominations might be 
taught as part of the common school moral curriculum. As 
Noah Feldman has observed, this created a dilemma for Mann 
and the other reformers: without religion, school would not 
276. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 98 ("If the chief purpose of public common 
schooling was moral education, and if moralit y had to be grounded in religion, there 
had to be some way to have religion in the schools.") . 
277. Catholicism was associated with "degeneracy and ruin." ld. at 93. 
278. ld. 
279. Id. at 92-93. 
280. On the role of religion in public schools, it is useful to contrast Mann with 
earlier school reformers, like Jefferson. Unlike Mann, Jefferson did not think common 
schooling and religious uniformity had to go hand in hand. He viewed his school reform 
proposals in the Bill for the More General Diffusion of Knowledge as complementary t o 
the guarantees of religious liberty in the Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. 
Thomas Jefferson, A Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom, § II (1779). As is well 
known , the latter bill barred compulsion in matters of conscience, as well as restraints 
and burdens on account of one's religious beliefs. ld. As Jefferson understood things, 
religious freedom was consistent with school reform because school reform aimed to 
foster public virtue, not the morals of a particular denomination, and a system of 
schools would impart the knowledge a nd sensibility with which individuals could freely 
arrive at sectarian religious commitments on their own. See THE COLONIAL 
EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, a t 442 . In contrast, common school reformers envisoned 
schools as compelling certain religious beliefs and dampening others. 
281. DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at 62-63. 
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have its moral content; but religious doctrine would create 
denominational strife. 282 The solution to the conflict was the 
program of "non-denominationalism" or "non-sectarianism."283 
While denominations had doctrinal differences, they united on 
core moral commitments, and these were the kinds of 
commitments that school should impart.284 Mann believed that 
these commitments could be imparted by reading the Bible 
without any accompanying commentary. 285 Reading the Bible 
without any comment would permit a student to judge the 
Bible "according to the dictates of his own reason and 
conscience."286 
The significance of non-sectarianism, however, can be 
overstated. Non-sectarianism excluded the millions of Catholics 
who had recently arrived in the country.287 More importantly-
and essential to understanding the common school system-is 
that interference with the practice of minority religions was an 
aim of the common school system.288 The movement for 
common school reform was driven by anxiety over the newly 
arrived, diverse immigrants. The common-school solution to 
this anxiety was to assimilate the immigrants. Thus, the 
common schools were not intended to protect liberty of 
conscience or promote religious diversity, but to counteract 
them.289 In this way, the common schools were a recognizable 
extension of traditional republicanism, with its focus on public 
virtue and homogeneity. 290 Only this view accounts for the fact 
that it was the Catholic opponents of the common school 
movement, not the proponents, who emphasized the 
importance of religious liberty_291 
These social changes-immigration, 
and religious revivalism-combined 
developments to give school reform 
282. ld. at 60-61. 
283. ld. at 61. 
284. ld. 
285. ld. 
286. ld. at 61-62. 
287. See DIVIDED BY Goo, supra note 55, at 63-65. 
288. See, e.g. , KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 163-64. 
289. See id. at 63-64. 
the growth of cities, 
with technological 
proposals increased 
290. As Michael McConnell has shown, traditional republicanism was opposed to 
the movement for religious liberty by minorities during the Virginia assessment 
controversy. McConnell, supra note 57, at 1437. 
291. See infra Part IV. 
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traction throughout the country. The primary effect of 
technological change was to bring distant parts of the country 
closer together. For example, as advances in communication 
and transportation cut down on rural insularity, the threat of 
instability perceived in the cities was perceived in rural regions 
as well. 292 Rural regions began to take economic interest in 
manufacturing regions. The development of an interregional 
system for the transportation of foodstuffs increased rural 
concern with the arithmetic and literacy necessary to 
part1c1pate in the market.293 Evangelizing state 
superintendents like Mann and John Pierce of Michigan "rode 
circuit" across their states, lecturing to audiences about the 
importance of state-regulated free school systems.294 They 
framed their claims for the importance of state schooling using 
the shared language of the contemporary religious movement. 
Together, these forces led to a series of changes in schooling 
practices, of which three are important here: the institution of 
attendance requirements, the rise of state educational agencies 
and officers, and the decline of "private" schools.295 
3. Changes in education policy 
First, attendance requirements were probably the least 
important of the common school reforms.296 The available 
evidence suggests that, at the time of reform, a large majority 
of eligible children in some states attended school at least 
sometime during the year. By 1850, around fifty percent of the 
children under the age of twenty attended school during the 
year in Massachusetts, New York, Michigan and Wisconsin.297 
Considering that children under five and over fifteen typically 
did not attend school, the attendance rate was likely 
considerably greater than fifty percent of the target age 
range.298 Of course, these states were educational leaders, and 
many other states did not reach similar enrollment figures. 
292. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 66. 
293. See HOWE, supra note 54, at l, 5-6; KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 63- 64. 
294. 'l'HE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 136; KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 
157. 
295. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 106, 111, 116. 
296. See id. at 106 ("These data support what is apparent from the reformers' own 
statements-that enrollment was not the cen t ral concern of the common-school 
movement .") . 
297. !d. 
298. !d. at 106- 07. 
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Figures for Pennsylvania and New Jersey put enrollments at 
around twenty percent in 1840 and forty percent in 1860.299 
When school reformers did focus on attendance, their concern 
was not with general enrollments but with particular groups, 
such as child workers, the children of freed slaves, and the 
perpetually truant.30° Child labor interfered with education 
mostly in immigrant communities, where many families 
needed income from an additional worker. Working conditions 
were often extreme, and children worked the same shifts as 
their parents.301 In their familiar way, reformers argued that it 
damaged the nation's interests for children to go morally 
uninstructed. In some cases they succeeded in securing the 
passage of state legislation requiring education for factory 
children, or, in the latter half of the century, prohibiting child 
labor altogether. Many of these statutes, however, went 
unenforced. 302 
The second major category of state regulation achieved by 
common school reformers is the development of state 
educational agencies and officers. The first of these reforms 
was the development of state boards of education and state 
superintendents. Many of the common school reformers were 
appointed to these leadership positions: Horace Mann in 
Massachusetts and Henry Barnard in Connecticut led their 
state boards of education; John Peirce was the first state 
superintendent in Michigan.303 The power of these positions 
was at first quite minimal, confined to gathering data on 
educational practices in the state.304 Where state 
superintendents were given larger powers, such as hearing 
appeals in educational disputes, local officials often failed to 
comply with their orders. 305 Nevertheless, these early leaders 
appear to have had a strong influence, at least in some states, 
on the development of state educational authority. This 
influence came not from their statutory power, but from the 
power of their personalities and their extended popular 
campaigns for school reform. Horace Mann was particularly 
299. ld. at 106. 
300. Id. at 107. 
301. See id. at 107·08. 
302. ld. at 108-09. 
303. Id. at 111- 113. 
304. Id. at 114. 
305. ld. at 115. 
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respected; a later state superintendent referred to him as the 
"Puritan of Puritans," and claimed that Mann was "born to be a 
champion."306 
State officials used their persuasive power to press for 
legislation increasing state control over education. Some of 
these efforts were successful, and some were not.307 Most states 
created state school funds, and, as discussed above, provided 
for the deposit of federal land grant receipts into those funds. 308 
Many states also pushed for an office of county 
superintendents, who would interpret state education laws, 
ensure reports were made to state agencies, encourage 
uniformity of textbooks, and examine the qualifications of 
teaching candidates. 309 The office of county superintendents 
was a controversial innovation, and their implementation and 
authority were limited in many instances. Textbook reform also 
proved challenging, in part because some parents resisted 
replacing family textbooks with state or county-recommended 
books.3 10 Textbook uniformity was not widely achieved until 
school districts began to purchase texts themselves, in the 
latter half of the nineteenth century. 311 These developments 
were piecemeal; reformers, however, were concerned with 
providing the kind of uniformity that only state regulation 
could accomplish, since uniformity would improve the 
consistency of school quality312 and promote the interest in 
assimilating diverse communities.313 With extensive 
campaigning, they achieved many of their goals by the 1890s, 
when most states had in place state boards, state and county 
superintendents, school funds, and control over teacher hiring, 
subjects taught, and textbooks.314 
The final category of change in this period was the decline 
of "private" schools. This point has to be made with some care, 
since the contemporary distinction between private and public 
schools did not exist until sometime in the middle of the 
eighteenth century. Before this time, schools were financed by 
306. Id. at 114. 
307. See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 55. 
308. Id. 
309. KAESTLE. supra note 44, at 115. 
310. See id. at 134. 
311. Id. at 134. 
312. Id. 
313. Id. at 71 , 156-57. 
314. See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 59. 
316 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL (2009 
a variety of sources. In the cities, independent pay schools and 
academies, which charged tuition, also received public money, 
as did religious charity schools.3 15 Rural district schools were 
financed by a combination of property tax revenue and 
quarterly fees. 316 This began to change during the time of 
common school reform, and a public school-private school 
distinction crystallized. 3 !7 
School reformers believed that common schools could only 
provide the promised social and moral benefits if all children 
attended them. If a large number of children attended private 
schools, or if parents of a particular cultural group or class 
educated their children in schools for them alone, society would 
lose the mutual understanding that common schooling could 
produce.318 Since common schools would have to be free to 
enable all to attend, the effort to bring everyone into free 
common schools took the form of an attack on "private" and 
religious schools. This attack took different forms. Rhetorically, 
reformers began to characterize private and religious schools as 
"not republican."319 Most interestingly, however, was the 
development in funding. New York is illustrative of funding 
changes that occurred in cities. In the 1820s, independent pay 
schools educated the majority of children in New York. 320 In 
1825, however, the New York Free School Society, which ran 
the largest charity school in the city, convinced the city council 
that public funds should not be distributed to denominational 
schools.321 This cut funding to charity schools run by the 
Baptists and Catholics, severely limiting the ability of these 
schools to serve their communities. The Free School Society 
then became the "Public School Society," and opened its doors 
to everyone, not only the poor.322 In 1832, attendance became 
free for all.323 This strategy drew students who would have 
gone to denominational charity schools and to independent pay 
schools. In fact, by 1850 the percentage of students attending 
315. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, a t 51, 57, 119; see also TYACK, J AMES & 
BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 26. 
316. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 13 . 
317. Id. at 117. 
318. ld. at 116. 
319. ld. (quoting Orville Taylor) . 
320. Id . 
321. ld. at 118. 
322. Id. at 116. 
323. ld. at 57- 58. 
2] PARENTAL RIGHTS AND STATE REGULATION 317 
private schools in New York had fallen from sixty-two percent 
in 1829 to eighteen percent. 324 In rural regions, common school 
reformers accomplished the same end by attacking "rate bills," 
which district schools used to charge parents tuition for 
attendance.325 Most northern states abolished rate bills by the 
middle of the nineteenth century.326 The only schools to 
successfully resist these attacks were the more expensive 
private academies.327 Even though common schools were now 
open to all, their charity school history did not immediately 
wear off, discouraging many wealthy families from sending 
their children to them. 328 
It was thus a change in circumstances, rather than a 
profound shift in educational theory, that precipitated the 
development of free common schools during the antebellum 
period. Republican concerns about the expanse of the country, 
cultural homogeneity and loyalty, and the necessity of a 
normative education remained important. To be sure, there 
were important changes in the educational theories of 
reformers. The rhetoric of school reformers crossed the 
boundary-if such a boundary can be maintained-between an 
emphasis on homogeneity and an emphasis on assimilating the 
alien.329 Jefferson's education in public virtue was replaced by 
an education in Protestant morals, and American Pan-
Protestantism became firmly implanted in the common school 
curriculum. 330 More significant than this theoretical drift were 
the social and economic changes occuring in the country. Waves 
of immigration, the rise of cities, industrialization, and 
westward expanse all heightened traditional republican 
anxieties, to which school systems had been proposed as a 
solution. The development of markets, the construction of 
transportation infrastructure, and increased communication 
324. !d. a t 116. 
325. !d. a t 117. 
326. !d. 
327. Id. at 117- 118. 
328. !d. at 118. 
329. Compare id . at 163 (describing the then-contemporary view of school as a 
"filter" to "cleanse" immigrants) , with THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 
117 (1980) (describing the concern with homogeneity among the founder s). This 
distinction remains difficult and vitally important to draw today. See Ginger 
Thompson, Where Education and Assimilation Collide, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2009, at 
Al. 
330. See supra note 280 and accompanying discussion. 
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connected rural areas to the cities, helping to overcome the 
political localism that defeated earlier school reforms. 
Taken together, these social and economic changes made 
school reform politically possible where it had proved 
impossible for Jefferson and Rush. Pro-reform Federalists and 
then Whigs were able to overcome the generally anti-reform 
Democrats, both at federal and state levels.331 The result was 
the development of a state regulatory apparatus which had, at 
the time, "by far the largest number of employees and the 
biggest budget of any activity of government in peacetime."332 
David Tyack has described public education in the nineteenth 
century as the "fourth branch of state government."333 As we 
have already seen, this so-called "fourth branch" had a strong 
religious character. 
IV. CATHOLIC SCHOOLS AND PARENTAL RIGHTS 
A. Public School Curriculum and Catholic School Financing 
While common school reformers, including Horace Mann, 
sought to establish a common school system with a non-
controversial "Christian" curriculm,334 the result in most cases 
was a "non-sectarian" or "non-denominational" Protestant 
education, emphasizing the pan-Protestant values of industry, 
thrift, self-control, private property, and traditional family 
roles.335 Both Catholic communities and Protestant 
communities found much to object to in this curriculum.336 
1. Public schools and the King James Bible 
The most intractable of the curricular disputes famously 
concerned the use of the King James Bible.337 Since its 
331. See TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 45-46, 53; see generally 
KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 148-58. 
332. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 45. 
333. !d. at 44. 
334. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 80; TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, 
at 162. 
335. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 93. 
336. ld. at 158; WALCH, supra note 252, at 26- 30; see JOAN D ELFATTORE, THE 
FOURTH R: CONFLICTS OVER RELIGION IN AMERICA'S PUBLIC SCHOOLS 15 (2004). 
337. DELFATTORE, supra note 336, at 21 , 34; WALCH, supra note 252, at 40-45; 
KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 168; TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 163- 64. 
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appearance 200 years earlier, the King James Version had 
. " h . f p t t t" "338 been, as Joan Delfattore put It, t e Icon o ro es an Ism. 
Its content bore the marks of denominational struggle. For 
example, the version in use during the 1840s referred to the 
Pope as "the man of Sinne," and expressly rejected papal 
authority. It attributed to the Catholic Church responsibility 
for the previous suppression of comprehendible translations 
and accused it of working to obscure religious truth. Perhaps 
more importantly, the King James Version contained no 
textual commentary, whereas Catholics believed that scripture 
should be accompanied with an authoritative commentary-
something that the Catholic Douay Bible contained.339 Thus, 
when school boards made concessions allowing for the use of 
any Bible without commentary, they were not "concessions" 
designed to appease the Catholics.340 As the Catholics saw it, 
reading the Bible without commentary was not non-sectarian, 
but a "Protestant concept" and "was more dangerous than no 
[biblical] education at all."341 
Some Catholic parents demanded that their children be 
permitted to opt-out of reading the King James Bible, but this 
request was not always granted. Even where school districts 
asserted that children could opt-out, the procedure was not 
often enforced. Rumors circulated of unsympathetic teachers 
demanding compliance, whipping and humiliating students 
who protested to reading King James. 342 Nor was the King 
James Bible the sole curricular conflict between Protestants 
and Catholics. Besides Bible reading, a school day often 
included Protestant hymns, the Lord's prayer, and the Ten 
Commandments-a slightly different list of commandments for 
Catholics and Protestants. School textbooks contained ethnic 
and religious slurs, as well as blunt dismissals of Catholicism 
and the Catholic Church.343 The entire curriculum of the 
common schools-as was consistent with the ideology of 
common school reform-reflected a reflexive belief in the 
superiority of American Protestantism and the necessity of its 
338. DELFATTORE, supra note 336, at 21. 
339. S ee id. at 34-35. 
340. S ee KAESTLE, supra note 44 , at 169 (noting Catholic opposition to such a 
practice). 
341. WALCH, supra note 253, at 28. 
342. See DELFATTORE, supra note 336, at 33-35. 
343. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 222. 
320 B.Y.U. EDUCATION AND LAW JOURNAL [2009 
dominance to the survival of the republic. 344 
Disputes over the bible led to violence in Philadelphia in 
1844.345 In an effort to prevent local school personnel from 
engaging in sectarian instruction, Philadelphia school officials 
issued a resolution prohibiting the introduction of religious 
material into the curriculum, unless approved by the school 
board.346 The board then proceeded to only approve the use of 
the King James Bible.347 The Irish Bishop of Philadelphia, 
Francis Patrick Kenrick, wrote a letter to the school board 
requesting that Catholic children be permitted to read from the 
Douay Bible and exempted from reciting the Lord's prayer.348 
The school board responded that no child would be forced to 
read from the King James Version.349 Mter Catholic parents 
reported that children were still being forced to read the Bible 
and punished for non-compliance, Bishop Kenrick formally 
complained to the school board and asked again that Catholic 
children be permitted to read from Douay.350 This time, the 
school board responded by allowing children to read from "any 
Bible without note or comment"-ruling out the Douay-but 
also established penalties for teachers who forced children to 
read from King James.35l 
Angry nativists spread the word that Catholics were trying 
to exclude Bible reading from schools altogether-a tactic not 
uncommon at the time.352 They characterized the complaints as 
evidencing a Catholic plan to subvert the will of the majority to 
the commands of the Catholic Church.353 As nativists began to 
campaign for popular support in an upcoming election, they 
staged rallies in Philadelphia neighborhoods heavily populated 
by Irish. Residents attacked the rallies. On May 6, two 
thousand nativists rallied in Kensington, an Irish 
neighborhood north of Philadelphia.354 While they were seeking 
cover from a rainstorm, a Protestant boy was shot; a riot 
344. See id. at 92-93. 
345. !d. at 170. 
346. DELFATTORE, supra note 336, at 33-34. 
347. !d. 
348. !d. 
349. !d. at 34. 
350. !d. 
351. !d. at 34-35. 
352. KAF;STLE, supra note 44, at 170. 
353. WALCH, supra note 252, at 45. 
354. DELFATTORE, supra note 336, at 35. 
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erupted, with Catholics shooting from the rooftops and 
Protestants smashing windows and breaking down doors .355 
The next day, three thousand nativists marched to Kensington, 
where they again fought residents and burned homes; the next 
day, two Catholic churches were burnt, despite efforts by city 
officials to intervene.356 Order was restored only after residents 
of the St. Augustine neighborhood-well-to-do Protestants-
organized informal peacekeeping groups and patrolled. 357 
In the end, disputes between Catholics and Protestants 
over Bible reading in the common schools were primarily about 
control, not doctrine. The anti-Catholic attitude of the time was 
primarily nativist, and sought not merely to ensure that 
Protestant doctrine was taught in schools, but that the 
dominant religious and ethnic groups in America remained 
dominant. 358 A religious xenophobia in part made up this view; 
nativists liked to spread worries of a Catholic fifth column, 
undermining the republic by taking orders from the pope. 
Whereas the King James Bible was everywhere associated with 
political liberty, the Douay Bible was an instrument for 
subjugating free people to the "Romish" church. 359 
But the battles had ethnic and cultural dimensions as well. 
Even where Irish Catholics attended common schools and 
complied with the curriculum, they were subject to verbal 
abuse as "paddies," and targeted as reqmrmg 
Americanization. 360 In a debate with nativist lawyers 
representing the New York Public School Society, Bishop John 
Hughes of New York read from a book purportedly in the school 
library, The Irish Heart , which expressed worry that Irish 
immigration would make the United States into "the common 
sewer of Ireland."361 Outside the school, of course, 
discrimination against the Irish was widespread. Verbal abuse 
was common in the streets and in the press, according to which 
the Irish drank and fought , and refused to act American.362 The 
dispute between Irish Catholics and Protestants in America's 
355. !d . 
356. !d. at 35-37. 
357. DELFATIORE, sup ra note 336, a t 37-38; WALCH, supra note 253, a t 48-49. 
358. S ee DELFATTORE, sup ra note 336, at 19- 21. 
35 9. Id. a t 19, 22. 
360. KAESTLE, supra note 44, a t 16:3. 
:361. Id. at 25- 26, 168. 
362. See D ELFATTORE, supra note 336, at 19 (quoting DIANE RAVI'TCH, THE GREAT 
SCHOOL WARS 29 ( 1974)) . 
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cities was thus, in large part, a battle for political recognition 
and equality. If the Irish could force common schools to include 
their Bible in its curriculum, it would show that they had to be 
accepted in the mainstream; conversely, Protestants were 
determined to keep the Bible out and the Irish marginalized. 363 
2. Public funding and Catholic schools 
Apart from their struggles with the common schools, 
Catholics had also long maintained their own schools. This was 
difficult; Catholic immigrants were often poor and unable to 
provide their schools with financial support. In some places, 
tax revenues filled the gap. Catholic schools in Massachusetts , 
Wisconsin and Connecticut, for example, received public funds 
until the 1840s-1860s.364 Nevertheless, many of these schools 
could provide education to only a fraction of the Catholic 
population.365 In New York City, Catholic charity schools had 
received tax revenue until 1825, when the then-New York Free 
School Society convinced the Common Council that it should 
cease funding denominational schools.366 While the primary 
target was likely other Protestant denominations, like the 
Baptists, whose schools were competing with those of the Free 
School Society, the effects of the decision were felt by Catholics 
as well. For years afterwards, many Catholic schools suffered 
from extremely limited capacity and operated in church 
basements.367 The situation generated another well-known 
conflict in the history of Catholic education. 
In 1841, Bishop Hughes, petitioned the New York City 
Common Council in request of public funds for Catholic 
schools. 368 He argued that Catholics, like Protestants, paid 
taxes, and should enjoy tax support for their schools. It was no 
answer that Catholic schools were sectarian, since the Public 
School Society common schools were sectarian as well, and 
functioned to impart Protestant beliefs and morals. If the 
Common Council continued to deny funds to Catholic schools 
based on sectarianism, he said, it should deny funds to the 
363. See WALCH, supra note 252, at 28; DELFATTORE, supra note 336, a t 18-19. 
364. KAESTLE, supra note 44, a t 166. 
365. See, e.g., WALCH, supra note 252, at 38 (descr ibing Ca tholic schools in Boston). 
366. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, a t 57, 166. 
367. WALCH, supra note 252, at 40. 
368. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 168. 
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common schools, as wel1.369 The argument infuriated the Public 
School Society, many of whose members were nativists, and 
rubbed raw the tensions in the city between immigrants and 
natives. After a raucous and vitriolic two-day debate on 
Hughes's petition, between Hughes and nativist lawyers, the 
Common Council denied funds on the grounds that the Catholic 
schools were sectarian.370 Hughes then turned to the state 
legislature, which, after several sessions, in 1842 took control 
over state education funds from the Public School Society-a 
voluntary association-and placed that control in the hands of 
popularly elected local school boards, some of which would be 
nominated by Catholics.J7 1 
Elsewhere, the effort to support Catholic schools met with 
more success. In 1831, residents of Lowell, Massachusetts 
appropriated fifty dollars to establish a "separate school for the 
benefit of the Irish population."372 Residents at the town 
meeting felt that it made sense to provide denominational 
education for the growing Catholic population for the same 
reasons that they provided tax support for Protestant 
education in local schools. The town committee planned to 
jointly administer the school with religious leadership, as it did 
in the Protestant schools.373 Under the terms of their 
agreement, the school committee reserved the right to examine 
and appoint school teachers, prescribe textbooks and 
curriculum, and to "examine, inspect and supervise" the 
school.374 For their part, parish priests required that the board 
appoint only "qualified Catholics" to teaching positions, and 
that textbooks contain no anti-Catholic statements. Parishes 
provided the school buildings, and the school committee paid 
teachers. The system was a success; by 1835, Lowell had three 
tax-funded Catholic schools enrolling, together, almost 4,000 
students. The agreement ended in 1852 when one Catholic 
parish invited the Sisters of Notre Dame to staff its school. The 
Lowell school committee refused to pay their salaries. Despite 
the unhappy conclusion, the Lowell plan gained renown and 
369. DELFATI'ORE, supra note 336, at 16-17. 
370. ld. at 26; WALCH, supra note 252, at 41. 
371. DELFATI'ORE, supra note 336, at 27-29; WALCH, supra note 252, at 42. 
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was copied in other communities.375 
In places where the Catholic population was greater, 
communities were better able to establish and maintain 
independent schools. The German Catholic population of the 
Midwest is perhaps the best example. As discussed above, 
German Catholics composed a large part of Wisconsin's 
population in the latter half of the nineteenth century. 
Wisconsin needed these settlers; unlike eastern states, it had to 
"recruit" immigrants inland with "cultural concessions."376 
Moreover, immigrants who could afford to travel inland often 
had greater resources and were therefore better able to fund 
independent schools.377 Moreover, Germans in particular 
manifested a strong interest in establishing schools. Both 
German Lutherans and German Catholics saw schooling as the 
means for preserving their traditions and religion for future 
generations.378 This view also affected public schooling in the 
Midwest. German Catholics and Lutherans used their political 
and economic leverage to encourage the hiring of German 
teachers and instruction either in both English and German, or 
German alone.379 
B. Legal Challenges and Catholic Parental Rights 
Early contests between Catholics and Protestants over 
schooling were primarily political. 380 In the case of New York 
City, the conflict involved the emergence of the Irish as a 
formidable political force, and was largely confined to op-eds, 
letters, debates, and finally, the ballot box.38 1 In Philadelphia, 
of course, the conflict took to the streets. Yet in most cases, the 
logic of these early disputes was "majority rule."382 Protestants 
regarded the common school curriculum as inoffensive and 
non-sectarian. Reading from the King James Bible, singing 
hymns, and reciting the Ten Commandments was simply how 
most Americans educated their children. 383 
375. Id. 
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377. Id. 
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In contrast, the conflict over Wisconsin's compulsory 
attendance statute took on a legal dimension, as well. Most 
states did not enact such statutes until the early twentieth 
century, but, in heavily German Wisconsin, the state 
legislature passed one as early as 1890.384 Known as the 
"Bennett Law," it required children between ages seven and 
fourteen to attend a school in their district, prescribed a 
curriculum, required teaching in the English language, and set 
criminal fines for non-compliance. 385 The legislation effectively 
prevented many parents from sending their children to 
religious schools, since they were often located outside the 
district where the family lived. The mandate requiring 
instruction in English also undercut efforts by Lutherans and 
Catholics to maintain their heritage.386 
Catholics and Lutherans protested such regulations 
vociferously. In Milwaukee, they were successful in replacing 
the Republican Mayor with a Democratic candidate who ran 
primarily against the law.387 Two years later, the Republican 
Governor who supported the Bennett Law also lost his seat, 
and a new slate of state legislators repealed the law.388 In this 
respect, the dispute in Wisconsin resembled the dispute in New 
York City; religious groups opposed to the Protestant-
dominated common schools used the political process to effect 
change. Notably, in Wisconsin, Catholics allied themselves 
with Protestant Lutherans to protect their rights to maintain 
independent "sectarian" religious schools. In New York, 
Catholics had struggled to obtain public financing without the 
assistance of allies. But, in another respect, the incidents were 
very different. In his attack on the funding of the New York 
common schools, Bishop Hughes had focused in large part on 
the anti-Catholic character of the curriculum.389 His aim was in 
part to show that the education in the common schools were 
sectarian, and convince the Common Council that, out of 
fairness , it should fund the sectarian Catholic schools as 
well. 390 In contrast, the arguments of the Catholic leadership in 
384. See Hunt, supra note 231, at 70. 
385. Hunt, supra note 231 , a t 70. 
386. !d. at 70- 71. 
387. !d . at 74-75. 
388. !d. at 82. 
389. KAESTLE, Sllpra note 44, at 163. 
390. DELFATTORE, supra note 336, at 16-17. 
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Wisconsin during the Bennett Law conflict focused on parental 
rights. 391 In their 1890 "Sapientiae Christianae," the three 
Catholic bishops of Wisconsin argued that "theirs was not a 
mere political protest, since the Bennett Law violated rights of 
parent and church in education .... [The law] was 'unjust' 
because it interfered with the 'sacred, inalienable rights of 
parents' in education."392 
As the Wisconsin bishops presented it, the parental right to 
educate one's children was itself a form of religious liberty. The 
bishops understood-as Catholic leadership elsewhere in the 
country also had-that Catholic education was central to the 
survival of the church in America. 393 Catholic schooling would 
produce Catholic adults. Because religious inculcation was the 
primary means of ensuring the well being and future of the 
church, a parent who chose to educate her child in a religious 
school was herself engaging in religious conduct. 394 It was 
conduct, moreover, that received sanction from church 
leadership at the highest level.395 In 1884, American bishops at 
the Third Plenary Council had stated that all Catholic parents 
were "bound" to send their children to Catholic school. 396 
Shortly afterwards, in January 1890, Pope Leo XIII issued an 
encyclical stating that the church was "absolutely oppose[d]" to 
the enrollment of children in the "impious" schools. Parents, 
391. Hunt, supra note 231 at 71-73, 76. 
392. ld. at 73 (quoting HARRY T. HEMING, THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN WISCONSIN 
283-86 (1896)). 
393. Id. at 85 (1981); see also WALCH, supra note 253, at 40 ("[T]he clergy persisted 
in establishing parish schools no matter what the cost because the very existence of the 
church in America depended on these institutions to protect future generations."). 
394. See Hunt, supra note 231, at 73 (noting that the parental obligation to provide 
a Catholic education stemmed from dvine law). 
395. This is a crucial point. Contrary to Noah Feldman's claim, when Catholic 
parents claimed that being forced to send their children to public schools violated their 
parental rights, they were not always making an argument that derived entirely from 
the Protestant notion of "liberty of conscience." See DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at 
65. While some Catholics did claim that mandatory attendance laws violated their 
liberty of conscience (a Protestant notion), others instead claimed that such laws 
required them to violate definitive pronouncements fro m the Catholic hierarchy that 
Catholics must send their children to Catholic schools. The source of the "right" in the 
latter case was not the protection afforded the liberty of conscience, but the protection 
afforded religious conduct in general. See Hunt, supra note 231 , at 73. 
396. Thomas C. Hunt & Norlene M. Kunkel , Catholic Schools: The Nation's 
Largest Alternative School System, in RELIGIOUS SCHOOLING IN AMERICA 1, 6 (James C. 
Harper & Thomas C. Hunt, eds., 1984) (quoting the Instruction of the Congregation of 
Propaganda de Fide, in CATHOLIC EDUCATION IN AMERICA: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
92 (Neil G. McCluskey ed., 1964)). 
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"by God-given right, have the duty to educate their children in 
accordance with the 'principles of Christian morality."' 397 
Writing the same year, the Wisconsin bishops repeated that 
the right to control education had its source in "natural and 
divine law," and urged that the state of Wisconsin had no 
"right" to compel students to attend the common schools.398 Nor 
was this claim limited to Catholic leadership. Catholic 
newspapers repeatedly asserted that the Bennett Law 
infringed parental rights.399 
Although the Bennett Law crisis was resolved politically, 
the assertion that compulsory attendance violated a religious 
right of parents to educate their children was an important 
development. In part, this fueled old fears that Catholics would 
take orders from Rome and undermine the country. But the 
rights claim was also being made elsewhere, and in some cases 
it evidenced an increasing sensitivity to the sectarianism of the 
public schools and the legitimacy of Catholic objections.40° For 
example, as early as 1876, Presbyterian minister Samuel 
Thayer Spear argued that Protestants urging prayer in schools 
"substantially ask for themselves in respect to the public schools 
what they deny Catholics." 
"King James's version is all very well for them ," Spear wrote, 
"since they are agreed in accepting it; but it is not so for these 
other parties, who are taxed in common with them for the 
support of public schools, and who under our theory of 
government have just as many and just as sacred rights as 
they have in these schools."401 
This transformation was felt primarily in state courts, 
where in the late nineteenth century suits over the King James 
Bible began to have success.402 
One early case was Board of Education v. Minor, in which 
the Ohio Supreme Court reversed a decision by a lower court 
striking a board of education policy that prohibited religious 
instruction and Bible reading in Cincinnati common schools.403 
397. Hunt, supra note 231 , at 72. 
398. Id. a t 73. 
399. ld. a t 71. 
400. See DELFATTORE, supra note 336at 52-54. 
401. DELFATTORE, supra note 336, at 52-53 (quoting THAYER SPEAR, RELIGION AND 
THE STATE 41 (1876)). 
402. Id. ; see also Thomas C. Hunt, The Edgerton Bible Decision: The End of an 
Era, 67 CATH. HIST. REV. 589 (1981); TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , at 163. 
403 . Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 , 243 (1872). 
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The dispute before the court had begun much like those in New 
York and Philadelphia thirty years earlier: Catholic leaders 
requested public funds for Catholic schools. When the 
Cincinnati Board of Education responded that it would not 
fund sectarian education, Catholics retorted that a common 
school curriculum including the King James Bible was also 
sectarian. Unlike the New York dispute, however, Cincinnati 
Catholics were accompanied in their resistance by other 
religious minorities, and the Board of Education, unlike the 
New York Public School Society and New York Common 
Council, was sensitive to the unfairness of funding Protestant 
education alone.404 In response to the request, the Board of 
Education passed a resolution prohibiting religious instruction 
and the reading of religious books, "including the Holy Bible," 
in city schools.405 
Protestants sued. They argued that a clause in the Ohio 
Constitution declaring "religion, morality and knowledge" to be 
essential to good government required that Ohio schools 
provide religious instruction.406 In an opinion by Justice Welch, 
the Ohio Supreme Court rejected the argument. It found that 
the constitution did not specify what religious or moral truths 
had to be taught, and thus left this to legislative 
determination, as it did the duty to provide for such an 
education.407 This point resolved the case. Nevertheless, the 
court continued at length, doing so in order to dispel the threat 
posed by the dispute to the "harmonious working of the state 
government."408 It is true, the court supposed, that the best 
religion is essential to the best government. But how should 
the best religion be secured? 
I answer, it can best be secured by adopting the doctrine of 
this 7th section in our own bill of rights, and which I 
summarize in two words, by calling it the doctrine of 'hands 
off.' . . . It is the true republican doctrine. It is simple and 
easily understood. It means a free conflict of opinions as to 
things divine; and it means masterly inactivity on the part of 
the state, except for the purpose of keeping the conflict free, 
and preventing the violation of private rights or of the public 
404. DELFATTORE, supra note 336, a t 56. 
405. I d. a t 57 (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Minor, 23 Ohio St. 211 , 211 (Ohio 1872). 
406. Minor, 23 Ohio St. at 243. 
407. ld. at 244, 245. 
408. ld. at 245. 
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peace .. . . It means that a man's right to his own religious 
convictions, and to impart them to his own children, and his 
and their right to engage, in conformity thereto, in harmless 
acts of worship toward the Almighty, are as sacred in the eye 
of the law as his rights of person or property, and that 
although in the minority, he shall be protected in the full and 
unrestricted enjoyment thereo£.409 
A number of things are remarkable about this unusual 
opinion, but two are important here. First, though dicta, 
Justice Welch clearly recognizes a parental free exercise right 
against interference with religious education. Unlike the right 
asserted in the case of the Bennett Law, this right has a basis 
in the Ohio Constitution and presumably affords a remedy to 
unlawful state regulation.410 This view gives a legal dimension 
to conflicts between the state and religious schools, which 
church leadership had previously sought to solve through 
political means. Moreover, while in the twentieth century Bible 
reading in public schools has been found to violate the 
Establishment Clause, the Ohio Supreme Court in 1872 
appears to regard it as implicating both establishment-like and 
free exercise-like rights.411 
Second, Justice Welch's comments have a Jeffersonian feel 
to them. Jefferson believed that state-administered free 
schooling and religious liberty went hand-in-hand.412 In this 
respect, he differed from most common school reformers in the 
1830s and 1840s, who understood the inculcation of Protestant 
morals to be an important goal of common schooling. A similar 
concern for the importance of religion to the republic led 
Justice Welch to a conclusion much closer to Jefferson's than 
Horace Mann's. In Welch's view, to arrive at the "best religion," 
one should enable "a free conflict of opinions as to things 
divine ," instead of inculcating one doctrine at the expense of 
another.413 This government is best served by a school that 
prepares students to choose freely between religions on the 
open market.414 
409. Id. at 250-51. 
410. ld. at 245. 
411. Id. at 250-51. 
412. See supra note 280. 
413. See Minor, 23 Ohio St. a t 250-51. 
414. See id. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The Introduction to this article makes two claims about the 
history of American education. First, it asserts that the history 
of education shows that parents have long ceded control to the 
state in regulating the education-even the religious 
education-of children.415 Second, it asserts that the history of 
education is problematic for proponents of what I called 
"equality theories" and "liberty theories" of the First 
Amendment's Religion Clauses.416 I would now like to return to 
these points and argue that the history discussed above has 
borne out the claims of the Introduction. I begin with the 
second point. 
A. Equality Theories and Liberty Theories 
An equality theory of the First Amendment argues that the 
purpose of the Religion Clauses is to protect political equality, 
in particular, to protect members of minority religions from 
members of majority religions. In contrast, according to a 
liberty theory of the First Amendment, the purpose of the 
Religion Clauses is to protect liberty of conscience. What 
relevance does the history of educational practices have for 
either theory of religious liberty? 
1. The problem: the republican character of early education 
One feature of each of the historical periods discussed 
above-colonization, founding, and antebellum-is that state 
interests in schooling were asserted in response to the 
perceived threat of instability or collapse. The earliest colonists 
in Massachusetts Bay faced the threat of collapse quite 
literally, and in response, the colonial government asserted 
new powers over educational practices that had hitherto taken 
place, for the most part, inside the home.417 Two hundred years 
later, the founders were themselves occupied with the prospect 
of collapse of the new federal government. They sought to 
introduce a common school system, in part to homogenize the 
citizenry and to instill a sense of public virtue, both of which 
415. See supra Part LA. 
416. See supra Part LB. 
417. See supra Part ILA. (discussing the changes in education that arose when 
settlers arrived in America). 
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they believed were necessary for the survival of so large a 
republic. 418 Finally, the common school reformers responded to 
the rapid influx of diverse immigrants and the city instability 
with a proposed common school system, which would 
Americanize immigrant Catholics by instructing them in core 
Protestant morals.419 In all three cases, reformers believed 
that, through formal education, the state could shape 
individuals and thereby avoid collapse. 
In both the founding and antebellum periods, proponents of 
universal education sought to offer moral education in the 
schools. As they saw it, only moral instruction could shape 
individual conduct in the ways necessary to avoid instability or 
collapse; thus, moral education was necessary for formal 
education to achieve its purpose.420 What "moral" education 
entailed, however, underwent a transformation. During the 
common school movement, moral instruction took on a more 
overtly doctrinal connotation, as reformers focused on the 
children of Catholic immigrants.421 Setting this difference 
aside, formal schooling in both periods was clearly designed to 
exert moral influence over individuals-to shape and to fashion 
their core beliefs and conduct-not to respect differences and 
leave them untouched.422 This is what I have referred to as the 
republican nature of early American education.423 
On its face, this aspect of early education is at odds with the 
418. See supra Part Il.B.l. & 2. (discussing concerns that citizens in a republic 
would not obey the laws, and that a la rge republic would not be homogenous enough to 
survive). 
41 9. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 163; see supra Part III.B.l. & 2. 
420. See DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at 60 (describing this reasoning in the 
case of the common school movement). The same r easoning was evident elsewhere. See, 
e.g., WOOD, supra note 105, at 120 (describing the view of the founders that education 
promoted virtue, which was necessary for republican government). 
421. See THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 140 (describing Mann's 
view of the appropriate common school curriculum as close to the "evangelical 
conceptions of the day"). Compare this description to the views of the founders about 
the significance of formal education, which appear much more civic in nature. See Part 
II.B. (describing these views). 
422. For an example of this attitude in the founding period, see supra note 108 and 
accompanying text. The church charity schools provide another powerful example, 
there designed to prevent children from remaining impoverished. See Part II .C. The 
attitude was widespread in the era of common school reform. 
423. For discussion of the meaning of "republican" as used here, see supra note 82; 
see supra Part II.B.l. & 2. On this account, republicanism emphasized the public good 
and the necessity of individual virtue for government by the people, in contrast to an 
emphasis on individual rights against the majority. See, e.g. , WOOD, supra note 105, at 
53-54, 61, 65-66. 
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assertion that we have long protected the liberty of conscience 
or the equality of members of minority religions, and that this 
should form the basis of our interpretation of the Religion 
Clauses.424 How could a liberty or equality theorist more fully 
account for the religious character of our educational practices? 
What changes might the history of education require in s~ch 
theories? 
2. Response one: the common schools were non-sectarian 
One possible response is that no changes are required. For 
example, a liberty theorist could argue that the common 
schools only functioned to impose on children the morals held 
in common by most members of society. While early school 
administrators drew on Protestant sources for those morals, 
this derivation does not, on its own, make them Protestant. 
They might have been derived from other sources as well. After 
all, how "sectarian" are the values of hard work, self-control, 
modesty, honesty, frugality, and respect for private property 
and traditional family roles-all emphasized by early 
curricular materials?425 Horace Mann made this "non-
sectarian" argument in support of the common schools in 
response to objections from members of minority Protestant 
denominations.426 Noah Feldman has recently taken a similar 
position, suggesting that the republican character of the 
common school curriculum-its nativist and anti-Catholic 
aspects-emerged only after immigrant Catholics began to 
object to the use of the King James Bible.427 We can call this 
response the "non-sectarian" response, since it emphasizes the 
shared, non-sectarian character of religious education in the 
common schools.428 
The non-sectarian response is unsatisfying for several 
reasons. First, it is in tension with much of the available 
historical scholarship, which suggests-contrary to Feldman's 
424. NUSSBAUM, supra note 55, at 2-5; DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, a t 27 . 
425. See HOWE, supra note 54, at 453 (noting the argument that "the common 
school embodied a common ideology"); KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 80- 83. 
426. DIVIDED BY GoD, supra note 55, at 61-62. 
427. Id. at 64-65. 
428. The response is not limited to the liberty theorist ; the same a rgument 
supports the equality theorist as well. For if a "non-sectarian" curriculum sufficed to 
protect the conscience of minority believers, it would ipso facto be unlikely to promote 
majority believers at the expense of minority believers. 
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view-that the Protestant curricula of the common schools was 
laced with anti-Catholicism from the beginning.429 In Kaestle's 
interpretation, the superiority of Protestantism to other 
denominations was intrinsic to the Protestant world view of the 
school reformers of the early nineteenth century.430 In other 
words, anti-Catholicism was not a later addition to the self-
understanding of Protestant reformers. On the contrary, along 
with the millennialism fashionable at the time, the sense of 
Protestant superiority accounted for much of the fervor with 
which Protestants organized in support of charity schools and 
then common schools.431 Feldman and other proponents of the 
non-sectarian response therefore must do more to provide it 
with an adequate historical foundation. 
Second, the non-sectarian response is internally 
inconsistent. To see how, consider how Horace Mann and other 
reformers used the "non-sectarian" argument. Mann used this 
argument to encourage members of minority Protestant 
denominations to support a common school system with a "pan-
Protestant" curriculum.432 We must assume that Protestants 
who gave their support saw a need for universal, systematic 
instruction in non-sectarian Protestant morals. But this raises 
an important question. What need could there have been for 
such instruction, if the morals it imparted were already 
universally shared by the population? Such a system could 
affect no moral change, since the children it taught would have 
been instructed in the same morals by their parents. Such a 
system would have been regarded by the public of Mann's time 
as woefully inadequate. That public was anxious about the rise 
of immigration in the cities and believed formal schooling 
should address it.433 If Mann's common schools offered only an 
innocuous, truly universal education, there would have been no 
reason for the public to support them. 
429. See, e.g., KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 92-93; see supra Part III.B. and the 
sources cited therein. 
430. See id. at 92-93 ("English Protestants had considered themselves the 
defenders of t he fai th ever since their split with Rome, and the American Puritans, in 
turn , believed that they had salvaged what was best in English Protestantism .... 
They associated Protestant Christianity with r epublicanism, with economic progress, 
and with virtue . . .. The tendency of the Roman Catholic religion, in contrast, 'was 
toward degeneracy a nd ruin' .... "). 
431. See id. 
432. See, e.g. , DIVIDED BY GOD, supra note 55, at 61- 62. 
433. See KA ESTLE, supra note 44, a t 63, 69 (describing the growth of cities and the 
anxiety it triggered) . 
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3. Response two: early education was viewed differently than the 
practice of religion 
How else, then, might a liberty or equality theorist account 
for the religious character of our educational practices? The 
most obvious way to preserve the liberty and equality theories 
in light of the history of education is to narrow their scope. For 
example, a liberty theorist could argue that, while a republican 
attitude towards religious differences prevailed in school, a 
very different attitude prevailed in political society at large. 
There is some support for this view. First, primary and 
secondary schools educate people who have not yet reached the 
age of political majority, and therefore may not enjoy full 
religious liberties.434 Second, the Religion Clauses protect 
individuals from government action, not from private 
conduct.435 Similarly, liberty of conscience and political 
equality are political ideals, not norms of private conduct. 
Early schools arguably belonged to the sphere of private 
conduct, as an extension of the activities of the family and the 
church.436 
While this response is somewhat attractive, fully 
substantiating it would require scholarly work beyond that any 
liberty or equality theorist has offered to date. For example, 
proponents would have to show what attitudes prevailed about 
the public or private character of school at the time of the 
founding and at the time of the common school movement. 
Moreover, the history discussed above suggests that American 
leaders were long aware of the vital political significance of 
schools. One could interpret Jefferson, Rush and Mann's state 
school plans as plans to transform schools into a part of 
political society, or argue that, properly understood, schools 
were already a crucial part of political society.437 If that is 
correct, then why a different attitude towards religious liberty 
should be taken in the schools than in other areas of political 
434. But see Yoder, 406 U.S. at 243-44 (Douglas, J. , dissenting). 
435. See, e.g. , 16A AM. J UR. 2D Constitutional Law§ 408. 
436. See supra Part II.A. for a discussion of this point. 
437. See WOOD, supra note 105, at 120 (noting the central role some founders 
attributed to education in preserving republican government) . As the discussion in Part 
II.B. makes clear, the founders regarded education as vitally important to the survival 
of the republic; as such, they could reasonably be viewed as a branch of government. 
See also TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 43- 76 (discussing the rise of state 
regulation of schooling and characterizing education as the fourth branch of state 
government). 
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life is unclear. 
4. Response three: we have sometimes subordinated religious 
liberty to other values 
A third response to the history of education is also possible. 
This response is that liberty of conscience and political equality 
are not overriding or absolute values. While we have long 
valued the liberty of conscience, and the political equality of 
members of different religions, we have also long subordinated 
these values to others, when the facts of a particular situation 
suggest it is necessary. As the common school movement 
shows, we have impinged on the liberty of conscience and 
individuals' genuinely held religious beliefs, and we have 
expressed preference for certain faiths over others. We do not 
have to regard all these cases as failures, although in some 
cases we clearly failed to act as we should have acted. In other 
cases, we simply judged that other values were more 
important. If this is correct, then neither the liberty theory nor 
the equality theory fully explains our practices, since those 
practices are more complex than either theory admits. 
B. Weighing Parental and State Interests in Education 
We can begin to reflect on what the history of education 
reveals about parental interests by reviewing the wide variety 
of interests that have appeared. Educational practices in the 
early republic-predominantly, the district system-gave 
parents and local school committees tremendous discretion. Yet 
this discretion is best understood as something short of legal 
authority, for it was not often politically challenged and was 
not often conceived as legally actionable.438 Parental discretion 
under the district system was, in effect, the de facto control of a 
very modest, heavily instrumental undertaking: learning to 
read from the Bible, learning to sign one's name, and learning 
basic rules of arithmetic. This was all most rural Americans 
wanted, and this is all they demanded of schools. Where early 
school reform failed, as it did in Pennsylvania and in Virginia, 
it was not because reformers met a parentry jealously guarding 
438. There was very little litigation over education in the early republic. TYACK, 
J AMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41 , a t 64---65. The first major parent-school disputes over 
control that ended up in court typically centered on school discipline, not religion. See 
KAESTLE, sup ra note 44 , at 160-61. 
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its "rights," but because no need was seen to fund a free state-
administered school system, and because Americans were 
inherently suspicious of state taxation and regulation.439 Thus 
while it should not be overlooked that in the early district 
system, parents possessed almost full control over schools, this 
fact does not evidence a long-standing assertion by parents 
that they had such control by right.440 
The first well-defined parental interests emerge later, in 
the political conflicts over educational reform during the 
common school movement. The church charity schools, from 
which the common schools sprung in the cities, were designed 
precisely to interfere with parent-child relationships by 
engaging in religious and moral instruction. In the view of the 
societies that ran them, such interference was necessary to 
prevent an impoverished parent from transmitting his bad 
character-and thus, his poverty-to the next generation.441 
Some common school reformers took a similar attitude towards 
the children of immigrants.442 This later precipitated a political 
struggle between immigrant parents and the common schools 
over the content of instruction. Still, for most of the 19th 
century, the warring interests were political. Neither reformers 
nor parents immediately sought to ground their position in 
state or federal constitutions; instead, they resolved disputes at 
the ballot box, where majority ruled.443 In New York City, this 
meant that the Protestants came out on top; in Wisconsin, the 
German Catholics and Lutherans prevailed. Because the 
process was political, the nature of the parental interest during 
this time was importantly limited: it was subject to, and 
confined by, the democratic process. 
The assertion of a proper parental right to religiously 
educate one's child emerged only near the end of the struggle 
over common schools, and was at first not well-defined. During 
the Bennett Law controversy, church authorities located the 
source for parental rights in divine law, in particular, in the 
439. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 9; THE NATIONAL EXPERIENCE, supra note 53, at 
108 (describing the opponents to early reform plans). 
440. See also Garvin Cty, 103 P. at 579 (noting that state regulations can narrow 
the common-law right of parents to control the education of children). There was 
relatively little constitutional litigation about parental rights until the twentieth 
centurty. See supra note 41. 
441. See supra Part II. C. 
442. KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 163; see supra Part III. B. 
443. TYACK, JAMES & BENAVOT, supra note 41, at 162. 
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duty God gave parents to ensure that their children were 
instructed in Catholicism.444 Since the survival of Catholicism 
depended on this education, the right asserted was essentially 
a right to a particular kind of religious conduct.445 But not all 
assertions of a parental right took this form. Some assertions of 
parental rights were based on the common-law right of parents 
to direct the upbringing of their children,446 which the state 
could not arbitrarily impinge.447 A variety of parental interests 
were at play. 
State interests in education also took a variety of forms, 
shaped by the various local and state educational practices. For 
example, several notable founders took an aggressive view of 
state interests in free schooling. They believed a strong 
primary education was necessary to the survival of republican 
government, to ensure the obedience of the people, good 
leadership, and the mutual understanding of citizens.448 For 
the most part, however, reform-minded founders were unable 
to achieve the school reform they hoped for. 449 Formal 
schooling in the early republic remained, for the most part, a 
local undertaking, although it was funded by a combination of 
tuition, donations, and public monies.45° Comprehensive reform 
and state regulation of schools came later, during the common 
school movement of the nineteenth century. 
It is this period that is most crucial to understanding the 
significance of state regulation of education. Common school 
reforms reflected a genuine recognition of the importance of 
universal school attendance, a standardized curriculum, the 
use of qualified teachers, and adequate funding.451 Changes in 
these areas had instrumental value, if nothing else; they 
444. Hunt, supra note 23 1, at 73. 
445. See id. ; Prince, 321 U.S. at 164 (acknowledging this characterization). 
446. See O'Hara, supra note 16, a t 5, 5 n.1 (citing Garvin Cty, 103 P. at 578). 
447. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403. As another variation, the appellant in Prince argued 
in the alternative that the state's regulation r estricted her child's right to practice 
r eligion. Prince, 321 U.S. at 164 ("Thus, two claimed liberties are at stake. One is the 
parent's , to bring up the child in the way he should go, which for the appellant means 
to teach him the tenets and the practices of their faith. The other freedom is the child's, 
to observe these .... "). 
448. See supra Part II. B. 
449. See supra Part II.B. (describing the rejection of reform plans in Virginia and 
Pennsylvania). 
450. See supra notes 190, 193 and accompanying text. 
451. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 106 (detailing the defects of the previous 
district system dominant in the North). 
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improved the quality of schooling for pupils.452 Yet this is , at 
best, only a partial picture of the school reform movement. The 
movement reflected the influence of other concerns as well. 453 
Viewed from one angle, these concerns centered around a 
concern to ensure social and political stability in the face of 
rapid demographic and economic changes.454 Viewed from 
another angle, however, the concerns were less innocuous. 
Indeed, they were invidious: reformers sought to replace 
Catholicism with Protestantism, a religion they regarded as 
naturally superior,455 and to Americanize newly arrived 
immigrants, particularly the Irish. 456 While the difference 
between these concerns is easy to mark conceptually, it is often 
hard to mark practically. Indeed, it seems likely that many 
common school reformers were moved by both innocuous and 
invidious concerns.457 
This history suggests several legal conclusions. First, it is 
inaccurate to juxtapose "traditional" parental rights with 
"newfound" state powers.458 In terms of the history of 
education, parents have only recently asserted a 
constitutionally significant "right" against the state power to 
regulate the education of their children, and they have long 
ceded some control over education to the state-including 
control over religious education. This suggests that it may be a 
mistake to apply a strict scruinty standard to state regulations 
burdening parental rights. 459 In the First Amendment Free 
Speech context, courts do not apply strict scrutiny where 
speech has historically been unprotected.460 More significantly, 
in the Free Exercise context, courts apply rational basis review 
452. Id. at 135 ("Normal schools, education journals, professional supervision, 
uniform textbooks, higher teacher wages, and other antebellum reforms were designed 
to bring a mesure of consistency and quality to a collection of local institutions that the 
reformers considered uneven and largely inadequate."). 
453. See generally id. at chp 5. 
454. See id. at 69. 
455. See id. at 92-93. 
456. See supra note 360 and accompanying text. 
457. See KAESTLE, supra note 44, at 75 (describing the reformers). 
458. See Yoder, 402 U.S. at 213-14. 
459. See id. at 215 (explaining the level of scrutiny). 
460. For example, consider regulations of the so-called "major" and "minor" 
"jurisdictions of censorship" under the Free Speech Clause, such as incitement or 
obscenity. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 18-19 (1973) (obscenity) ; Brandenburg 
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (incitement). The "major" and "minor" "jurisdictions of 
censorship" terminology comes from HARRY KALVEN , JR., A WORTHY TRADITION: 
FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN AMERICA (1988). 
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to challenges of facially neutral, generally applicable laws; the 
only exception is a "hybrid" claim, such as one resting on both 
Free Exercise and parental rights.461 However, given what we 
now know about parental rights, the application of strict 
scrutiny to hybrid claims makes little sense. Parental 
educational rights have long been subject to state interference. 
For many years, it was irrelevant whether religious eduation 
was at issue. "Hybridization" did not matter.462 Moreover, 
where the Supreme Court has struck down a regulation purely 
because it infringed parental rights, it has done so because the 
regulation was unreasonable or the end not "within the 
competency of the state."463 Why should two rights (Free 
Exercise and parental rights), both of which the state may 
infringe if it can satisfy rational basis review, suddenly require 
strict scrutiny when combined? 
Some form of heightened scrutiny may be appropriate in 
light of the multiple interests at stake. Some form of 
heightened scruinty may also be necessary at the balancing 
stage of a claim that the state violated a parent's right to direct 
her child's religious education. This is because of the problem 
discussed above, namely, that historically the interests 
asserted by the state in regulating education have had a janus-
faced character to them. Heightened scrutiny may be necessary 
to determine whether the state action in question is innocuous 
or invidious. This would presumably require some examination 
of the record. Under rational basis review, however, a 
hypothetical legitimate state interest would suffice to satisfy a 
constitutional challenge. The history of state regulation of 
education suggests that courts should require something more. 
461. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990) (discussing Yoder). 
462. Notably, the Supreme Court stated in Prince that a parental right claim 
(based in due process) "extends no further than that to freedom of religion, since in the 
circumstances all that is comprehended in the former is included in the latter." Prince, 
321 U.S. at 164 n.8. 
463. Pierce, 268 U.S. at 535 (applying the rule that "rights guaranteed by the 
Constitution may not be abridged by legislation which has no reasonable relation to 
some purpose within the competency of the State."); Meyer, 262 U.S. at 403. 
